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NOTE
WRITING THE BOOK[ER] ON BLAKELY:
THE CHALLENGE TO THE
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

In all criminalprosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial,by an impartialjury... and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.
1

U.S. Constitution
I.

INTRODUCTION

On June 24, 2004, in a five-to-four decision, 2 the United States Supreme Court
created what Justice Sandra Day O'Connor later called "a [number] 10 earthquake" 3 in
the world of federal sentencing-holding that the maximum sentences, as enhanced by

aggravating factors in sentencing guidelines, could be no longer than the maximum
sentence which could have been imposed for the crime without additional findings by a
judge. 4 While the case originated in the State of Washington 5 and, therefore, involved
6
application of that state's laws, news articles speculated that Blakely v. Washington
could spell the end of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 7 Weblogs (also referred to as
"blogs" or "blawgs," in the case of some dealing with the law) heralded the news, 8 and at
least one blog was devoted to Blakely.9

1. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
2. Blakely v. Wash., 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) (Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Stevens, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. O'Connor, J., dissenting, in which Breyer, J., joined, and
in which Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, J., joined except as to Part IV-B. Kennedy, J., dissenting, in which
Breyer, J., joined. Breyer, J., dissenting, in which O'Connor, J., joined).
3. Erik Luna, Reprieve on Sentencing Guidelines? Washington Times (D.C.) B04 (Aug. 8, 2004).
4. Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2537 (majority opinion). For enhancements based on prior convictions, Blakely
followed the course set in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), and followed by
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490-91 (2000), and continued to carve out an exception, requiring no
finding of fact by the jury. Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2536. While Blakely does nothing to disturb that exemption,
the Court has granted certiorari in a case that challenges that exception. See Shepard v. U.S., 125 S.Ct. 1254
(2005). Four of the five Justices comprising the majority opinion in Blakely dissented in Almendarez-Torres;
only Justice Thomas joined in that majority opinion. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224.
5. Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2534.
6. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
7. Adam Liptak, Sentencing Decision's Reach Is Farand Wide, 153 N.Y. Times 16 (June 27, 2004).
8. See e.g. Douglas A. Berman, Sentencing Law and Policy, http://sentencing.typepad.com (accessed
Oct. 15, 2004); Blakely Blawg, http://blakelyblawg.blogspot.com (last updated July 13, 2004).
9. Blakely Blawg, supra n. 8. This blog has since ceased posting, and now directs readers to Douglas A.
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In the wake of the decision, the United States Department of Justice maintained
that Blakely should have no adverse effect on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 10 yet
"Blakely-ized"11 its indictments. Federal courts were divided regarding Blakely's impact
on the Federal Guidelines.12
Less than a week after the Court's opinion in Blakely, District Court Judge Paul
Cassell ruled in United States v. Croxford13 that the defendant could not be sentenced
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines since the prosecution had requested two
enhancements that would involve judge-found facts. 14 With this ruling, Judge Cassell
effectively held that Blakely had made the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
unconstitutional, at least in these circumstances.
Shortly thereafter, in United States v. Booker 15 the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held that Blakely applied to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, making them
unconstitutional when sentences were enhanced based on judge-found facts. 16 Within
days, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Blakely did not apply to the United
States Sentencing Guidelines because the "'maximum punishments' are those defined
and authorized by Congress in the United States Code" 17 rather than any maximum
18
sentence specific to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
Initially a number of federal district courts found the Guidelines unconstitutional.1 9
Some held the Federal Sentencing Guidelines wholly unconstitutional, 20 while others
found

them

salvageable

through

severability. 2 1

Those

holding

the

Guidelines

unconstitutional, whether in whole or in part, disagreed about how sentences should be

determined post-Blakely. Some preferred a return to indeterminate sentencing using the

Berman's blog, SentencingLaw andPolicy, supra n. 8.
10. Memo. from James Comey, Dep. Atty. Gen., U.S. Dept. Just., to All Fed. Prosecutors, Departmental
Legal Positionsand Policies in Light ofBlakely v. Washington 1-2, http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_
lawandjpolicy/files/dagblakely_memo 7204.pdf (2004) [hereinafter Memo. from James Comey].
11. The adjective, "Blakely-ized," is being used to describe modifications made to various aspects of
criminal proceedings to assure that they do not run afoul of Blakely. "Blakely-ized" indictments are those in
which prosecutors have alleged all facts to be considered for sentencing.
12. See e.g. U.S. v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464, 473 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, vacated, 125 S. Ct. 1003
(2005); US. v. Koch, 383 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted,vacated, 125 S. Ct. 1944 (2005); US. v.
Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004), affd andremanded, US. v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738, 769 (2005); US. v.
Ameline, 376 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2004); US. v. Zompa, 326 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D. Me. 2004); U.S. v. Fanfan,
2004 WL 1723114 (D. Me. June 28, 2004), vacated and remanded, Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769; US. v.
Mueffelman, 327 F. Supp. 2d 79 (D. Mass. 2004); U.S. v. Sisson, 326 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D. Mass. 2004); US. v.
Croxford, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12156 (D. Utah June 29, 2004).
13. 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12156 (D. Utah 2004).
14. Id.at *40.
15. 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004).
16. Id.
at 508, 514-15.
17. Pineiro,377 F.3d at 473.
18. Id.
19. See e.g. Zompa, 326 F. Supp. 2d 176; Fanfan, 2004 WL 1723114; Mueffelman, 327 F. Supp. 2d 79;
Sisson, 326 F. Supp. 2d 203; US. v. Landgarten, 325 F. Supp. 2d 235 (E.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated, 325 F. Supp.
2d 235 (2004); U.S. v. Medas, 323 F. Supp. 2d 436 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); U.S. v. Agett, 327 F.Supp. 2d 899 (E.D.
Tenn. 2004); Croxford, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12156; US. v. Lockett, 325 F. Supp. 2d 673 (E.D. Va. 2004);
U.S. v. Shamblin, 323 F. Supp. 2d 757 (S.D.W. Va. 2004).
20. See e.g. Mueffelman, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 82; Medas, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 436.
21. See e.g. Zompa, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 178; Fanfan, 2004 WL 1723114 at **11-t2; Shamblin, 323
F. Supp. 2d at 765-66.
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Federal Sentencing Guidelines as actual guidelines rather than as mandates. 22 Others
believed the Guidelines were still valid so long as the sentence imposed would not
exceed the maximum presumptive sentence. 2 3 Still other courts
suspended sentencing
24
pending clarification from the United States Supreme Court.
Since their inception, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have been challenged in
the Supreme Court numerous times. 25 While they withstood each of these attacks, 26 the
earlier challenges had not involved a Sixth Amendment challenge. 2 7 Most believed that
the Guidelines could not survive this latest challenge intact. 28 While Justice Antonin
Scalia's dissent in Mistretta v. United States2 9 might be considered foreshadowing of his

majority opinion in Blakely,30 the Court's decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey3 1 and
Ring v. Arizona 32 may be viewed as the opening salvos in the sentencing revolution that
33
broke out after the Blakely decision.
Apprendi enunciated the importance of the jury in making determinations that
would deprive individuals of their liberty, 34 holding that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 35 Two
years later, in Ring, the Court held that an Arizona law allowing judges to impose the
death penalty after a judicial finding of certain enumerated aggravating factors was
incompatible with Apprendi and with the Sixth Amendment. 36 Still two years later, the
Court delivered its Blakely decision-possibly the coup de grace for sentencing
guideline schemes, both state and federal. Less than two months later, the U.S. Supreme

22. See e.g. Mueffelman, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 96; Sisson, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 204.
23. See e.g. Zompa, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 178; U.S. v. Thompson, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1275 (D. Utah 2004).
24. Douglas A. Berman, Booker/Blakely Backup, http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law and
policy/2004/ 1/emblakelyemembo.html (Nov. 23, 2004).
25. See U.S. v. King, 328 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1281 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (citing Edwards v. U.S., 523 U.S. 511
(1998); U.S. v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997); Witte v. U.S., 515 U.S. 389 (1995); Stinson v. U.S., 508 U.S. 36
(1993); Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361 (1989)).
26. King, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 1281, 1281 n. 10.
27. Id.at 1281; contra Booker, 375 F.3d at 516-17 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
28. Tony Mauro, Justices Ready to Apply Blakely to Federal Guidelines? 30 Conn. L. Trib. 10 (Oct. 11,
2004); Tony Mauro, CourtSeems Apt to DiscardGuidelines, 232 N.Y. L.J. 1 (Oct. 5, 2004).
29. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
30. See id. at 413. In his dissent, Scalia referred to the Federal Sentencing Commission as a new branch of
the government, "a sort of junior-varsity Congress." Id.at 427. He suggested that such a branch might, at
times, be desirable, but noted that being desirable does not make a thing constitutional. Id. He warned "in the
long run the improvisation of a constitutional structure on the basis of currently perceived utility will be
disastrous." Id.
31. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
32. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
33. Michael Kirkland, On Law: So You Say You Want a Revolution, http://washingtontimes.com/upibreaking/20041008-121416-8437r.htm (Oct. 8, 2004).
34. In Apprendi, the defendant, who had fired shots into the home of an African-American family, 530 U.S.
at 469, received an enhanced sentence in excess of the statutory maximum for his crime, based on the judge's
finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Apprendi's actions were racially motivated and "were taken
'with a purpose to intimidate."' Id. at 471.
35. Id.at490.
36. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609. The Court reasoned that "[b]ecause Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors
operate as 'the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,' the Sixth Amendment requires that
they be found by a jury." Id.(citation omitted).
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Court granted certiorari to two cases, one from the Seventh Circuit 37 and one from the
District Court of Maine in the First Circuit. 38 The question in each was whether Blakely
applies to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and, if so, what to do about it. In an
unusual move, the Court put these cases on a fast track, consolidating them and
39
scheduling a hearing for October 4, 2004.
Speculation abounded after the hearing as to when the Court would issue its
opinion in United States v. Booker and United States v. Fanfan. Due to the importance
of the case and its already expedited treatment, expectations were that the opinion would
be issued before the end of the year.4 1 There was even a prediction that it would be
issued before Thanksgiving. 4 2 Despite predictions to the contrary, the Court issued its
opinion on January 12, 2005. 4 3 The opinion was both predictable and unpredictable.
Two majority opinions were issued, each with a five-to-four vote. 44 The "merits
opinion ' ' 5 came as no great surprise, 46 holding that "the Sixth Amendment as construed
in Blakely does apply to the Sentencing Guidelines.' ' 7 The Court's "remedial
opinion ''48 declared that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were no longer mandatory,
but were, instead, advisory. 49 In Blakely, Justice O'Connor predicted that "[t]he 'effect'
of [the Blakely] decision will be greater judicial discretion and less uniformity in
sentencing., 50 The Court's Booker remedy bears out the first part of her prediction-

37. Booker, 375 F.3d 508.
38. Fanfan, 2004 WL 1723114.
39. U.S. v. Booker, 542 U.S. 956 (2004); U.S. v. Fanfan, 542 U.S. 956 (2004).
40. See e.g. Howard J. Bashman, How Appealing, http://www.legalaffairs.org/howappealing/2004 12 01
appellateblogarchive.html#l 10295749846105182 (Dec. 13, 2004) (noting that since neither Justice Stevens
nor Scalia had yet authored a majority opinion for the October 2004 argument session, one of them had been
assigned the Booker/Fanfan opinions, and predicting the opinion would be handed down in January 2005);
Douglas A. Berman, Sentencing Law and Policy, Will It Be Today, or Another Month of Waiting?
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencinglaw-andjpolicy/2004/12/will-it-be-toda.html
(Dec. 13, 2004);
Douglas A. Berman, Sentencing Law and Policy, Wolf. Wolff. ... I Mean Booker and Fanfan,
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing-law-andjpolicy/2004/12/wolf wolf-i -mea.html (Dec. 3, 2004);
Douglas A. Berman, Sentencing Law and Policy, Tomorrow's the Big Day? http://sentencing.typepad.com/
sentencinglaw and_policy/2004/1 1/tomorrows the b.html (Nov. 8, 2004); Douglas A. Berman, Sentencing
Law and Policy, When Will Booker and Fanfan Be Decided? http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_
law andpolicy/2004/08/when will emboo.html (Aug. 20, 2004) [hereinafter Berman, When Will Booker and
Fanfan Be Decided?]; Marty Lederman, Booker/Fanfan Timing Tealeaf? http://www.goldsteinhowe.com/blog/
archive/2004_11 28 SCOTUSblog.cfm#1 10185763350700617 (Nov. 30, 2004).
41. Douglas A. Berman, Sentencing Law and Policy, Not So Fast? http://sentencing.typepad.com/
sentencinglaw and policy/2004/1 I/noso fast.html (Nov. 8, 2004).
42. Berman, When Will Booker and Fanfan Be Decided? supra n. 40 (predicting that the cases will be
decided "after Halloween, but before Thanksgiving").
43. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 738.
44. Id.
45. Justice Stevens delivered the "merits opinion," joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas,
and Ginsburg.
46. David Stout, Supreme Court Rules Judges are Not Bound by Sentencing Rules, http://www.nacdl.org/
public.nsf/mediasources/20050112c (Jan. 12, 2005).
47. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746 (Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in part, in which Scalia,
Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined [hereinafter (merits opinion)]).
48. Justice Breyer delivered the "remedial opinion," joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg.
49. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756 (Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in part, in which Rehnquist,
C.J., and O'Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined [hereinafter (remedial opinion)]).
50. 124 S. Ct. at 2543 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, in which Breyer, J., joined, and in which Rehnquist, C.J.,
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judges now have greater discretion in sentencing. Whether they exercise that discretion
in a way that lessens uniformity in sentencing remains to be seen.
This article will look at both the Blakely and Booker opinions. Part II will review
Blakely v. Washington, the case that brought heightened attention to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. Part III will outline the development of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, compare those Guidelines to the guidelines used in the state of Washington
that were the subject of the Blakely decision, and briefly address how severability might
have preserved constitutionality. Part IV will discuss the various federal courts'
responses to Blakely as it applied to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines pre-Booker.
Part V will explore several pre-Booker proposals for a solution to the challenge brought
by Blakely. United States v. Booker and United States v. Fanfan, the two cases that
resulted in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines becoming advisory rather than mandatory,
will be reviewed in Part VI, with Part VII discussing the federal courts' application of
the Booker opinions, specifically regarding the degree to which the now advisory Federal
Sentencing Guidelines should affect sentencing. Finally, Part VIII will conclude that the
post-Booker sentencing landscape is, so far, rather similar to the pre-Blakely sentencing
landscape and ask whether it is appropriate that the status quo remain or whether changes
need to be made to curb discretion and/or to enhance Sixth Amendment protection.
II.
A.

BLAKELY V. WASHINGTON

The Trial Court

The case that triggered the recent upheaval, Blakely v. Washington,5 1 began with a
troubled man and a troubled marriage. Ralph Howard Blakely, Jr., had been diagnosed
with various disorders including paranoid schizophrenia. 52 He and his wife, Yolanda,
married in 1973. 53 Twenty-two years later, Yolanda filed for divorce. 54 Apparently
wanting to convince her to dismiss the divorce, in 1998, Blakely abducted Yolanda at
knifepoint, confining her in a wooden box in his pickup truck. 55 Blakely also involved
the couple's thirteen-year-old son, requiring him to follow the truck in a car. 56 Blakely
57
convinced the son to do so by threatening to hurt the child's mother with a shotgun.
The child escaped at a gas station and attempted to get help, but Blakely was able to
leave and ultimately took Yolanda to Montana. 58 Blakely
stopped at a friend's house
59
and was later arrested after his friend called the police.

and Kennedy, J., joined except as to Part IV-B [hereinafter (O'Connor dissent)]).
51. 124 S. Ct. 2531.
52. Id. at 2534 (majority opinion).
53. Id.
54. State v. Blakely, 47 P.3d 149, 152 (Wash. App. Div. 2002).
55. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2534.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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Blakely made a plea agreement with the State of Washington. 60 In entering his
plea, Blakely admitted nothing other than the elements of kidnapping, domestic violence,
and use of a firearm. 6 1 In return, he was charged with "second-degree [kidnapping]
involving domestic violence and use of a firearm. ' 62 The original charge had been
first-degree kidnapping, 63 which, as charged, included the intent to inflict extreme
mental distress. 64 Second-degree kidnapping does not include that intent. 65
Although the State recommended a sentence of 49 to 53 months, 66 the judge, using
a provision in Washington law that allowed him to impose a longer sentence if he found
reason to justify it, 67 sentenced Blakely to 90 months, 68 citing "deliberate cruelty" as the
reason for the increase. 69 Blakely objected to the 37-month increase in his anticipated
sentence, and the judge subsequently held a bench hearing. 70 During the three days of
the hearing, a police officer and medical experts testified, as did Blakely, his wife, and
their son. 7 1 After the hearing, the sentence remained at 90 months, with the judge still
citing "deliberate cruelty" as the reason for the upward departure from the State's
recommendation. 72
B.

Court ofAppeals of Washington

Blakely appealed.73 Citing Apprendi,74 Blakely argued that the facts must have
been submitted to a jury and have met the reasonable doubt standard before he could be
given an exceptional sentence. 75 The Washington Court of Appeals held that Apprendi
did not apply and affirmed the lower court's ruling, 76 relying on a recent Washington
Supreme Court case 77 holding "that Apprendi does not apply to factual determinations
78
that support reasons for exceptional sentences upward."
In addition to the Apprendi issue, Blakely's appeal to the Washington Court of
Appeals raised several other issues. One involved judicial discretion. Blakely contended
that the prosecutor had violated the plea agreement by advocating for an exceptional
sentence upward.79 The appeals court made repeated reference to the trial judge's

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2534-35.
Id.
Id. at 2534.
Id.
Blakely, 47 P.3d at 158.
Id.
Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535.
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.94A.120(2) (West 2000).
Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2536.
Blakely, 47 P.3d 151.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466.
Blakely, 47 P.3d at 159.
Id.
Id. (citing State v. Gore, 21 P.3d 262 (Wash. 2001)).
Id.
Id. at 155.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol41/iss2/9

6

Pettit: Writing the Book[er] on Blakely: The Challenge to the Federal Sen

2005]

THE CHALLENGE TO THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

371

apparent predisposition to sentence enhancement and found that the prosecutor had
81
assiduously refrained from crossing the line into advocating the sentence enhancement.
Instead, the prosecutor consistently recommended a sentence at the high end of the
standard range. 82 Completely on his own, the judge sought to increase 83Blakely's
sentence beyond that indicated by the guidelines and sought by the prosecutor.
Blakely also tried to show that the court, in increasing his sentence, had considered
facts that would establish first-degree kidnapping and, thus, had violated the state's "real
facts doctrine, ' 84 which prohibits the sentencing court from basing an extraordinary
sentence on facts that would establish a more serious crime. 85 Blakely equated the trial
judge's finding of "deliberate cruelty" with "intent to inflict extreme mental distress," an
element of first degree kidnapping. 86 Blakely's plea 87 had been to second-degree
kidnapping. The appeals court distinguished between "deliberate cruelty" and "intent to
inflict extreme mental distress," 88 but chose to sidestep the "real facts" issue by finding
89
alone as the
that the exceptional sentence was supported by domestic violence factors
91
90
was stipulated in the plea
While simple domestic violence
aggravating factors.

Blakely entered, that stipulation alone was insufficient under Washington law to increase

80. The appellate court referred to the lower court's observation that "the evidentiary hearing was probably
an 'exercise in futility,' because there was no dispute that Mr. Blakely put his wife in an apple wood box and
kept her there in the presence of [her son,] Ralphy," Blakely, 47 P.3d at 156 (citation omitted), and observed,
"Apparently the trial court intended to impose an exceptional sentence based on the record, regardless of the
State's recommendation." Id. The appellate court concluded that "the sentencing court's conclusion from the
start [was] that undisputed facts in the record supported an exceptional sentence based on domestic violence
and deliberate cruelty." Id. at 157.
81. Id. at 155-57.
82. Id.
83. Blakely, 47 P.3d at 156.
84. Id. at 157-58.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 158.
87. Charges were amended to "one count of second degree domestic violence kidnapping with a deadly
weapon enhancement and one count of second degree domestic violence assault. In exchange for the amended
charges and a recommendation for a sentence in the high end of the standard range, Mr. Blakely agreed to an
Alford plea of guilty." Id. at 153 (footnote omitted); Blakely, 47 P.3d at 153 n. 2 ("See North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (a defendant may plead guilty while disputing the facts alleged by the
prosecution)." (citations omitted)).
88. Id. at 158.
89. The Blakely court noted:
The real facts statute specifically allows the court to consider acts of domestic violence that involve
deliberate cruelty or intimidation of the victim as well as acts of domestic violence committed in the
presence of the victim's or offender's minor child. Because the trial court found that these
aggravating circumstances also supported a departure from the standard range, the exceptional
sentence is justified as a matter of law.
Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
90. Id.
91. The amended charges included domestic violence, but without specifying deliberate cruelty,
intimidation, or being committed in the presence a child of either the victim or offender. Id. at 158. The latter
factors were found by the court as aggravating circumstances. Blakely, 47 P.3d at 158.
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92
the standard range of the sentence. Blakely's sentence was increased by nearly 70%
94
based on the judge's finding of "domestic violence with deliberate cruelty."

C.

93

The United States Supreme Court

1.

The Majority Opinion

Stating, "The judge in this case could not have imposed the exceptional 90-month
sentence solely on the basis of the facts admitted in the guilty plea," 9 5 the Supreme Court
reversed the lower court's judgment. 9 6

In so holding, the Court emphasized that the

relevant "statutory maximum" is "the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on
the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."97

While

the appellee had argued that the maximum sentence for second degree kidnapping was
ten years under Washington law, 98 the Court held that the maximum sentence was
limited to 53 months, 9 9 since that was the upper end of the standard of 49 to 53

months, 10 0 the sentence for the crime to which he pled.
Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Blakely--which has been described as "both

majestic and mysterious" 101-repeatedly looked back to historical roots for the right to
trial by jury. 10 2 His opinion in this case should come as no surprise to those familiar
with his prior dissents and concurrences.10 3 From 1998 through 2004, ideas expressed in

92. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535 n. 3.
93. Id. at 2539-40. The additional 37 months to which Blakely was sentenced is 69.8% of the 53 month
maximum under the standard range.
94. Blakely, 47 P.3d at 158 n. 3. Although both the Supreme Court and the Washington Court of Appeals
referred to "domestic violence with deliberate cruelty" as the aggravating factor on which the enhanced
sentence was affirmed, Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535 n. 4; Blakely, 47 P.3d at 158 n. 3, the appeals court
decision's "Facts" section indicated that "the trial court... imposed an exceptional sentence of 90 months for
the kidnapping, citing the aggravating factors of deliberate cruelty and commission of domestic violence in the
presence of a minor child." Blakely, 47 P.3d at 154.
95. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537.
96. Id.at 2543.
97. Id.at 2537 (emphasis in original).
98. Id.
99. Id.at 2543.
100. Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2535.
101. Douglas A. Berman, Examining the Blakely Earthquake and Its Aftershocks, 16 Fed. Senten. Rpt. 307,
308 (2004).
102. Justice Scalia commented:
This rule [from Apprendi] reflects two longstanding tenets of common-law criminal jurisprudence:
that the 'truth of every accusation' against a defendant 'should afterwards be confirmed by the
unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours,' and that 'an accusation which lacks
any particular fact which the law makes essential to the punishment is... no accusation within the
requirements of the common law, and it is no accusation in reason.'
Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2536 (citation omitted, ellipses in original). He goes on further to suggest "Our
Constitution and the common-law traditions it entrenches... do not admit the contention that facts are better
discovered by judicial inquisition than by adversarial testing before a jury." Id. at 2543.
103. In his concurring opinion in Ring, Justice Scalia wrote: "What today's decision says is that the jury
must find the existence of the fact that an aggravating factor existed." 536 U.S. at 612 (emphasis in original).
In Apprendi, he wrote:
I think it not unfair to tell a prospective felon that if he commits his contemplated crime he is
exposing himself to a jail sentence of 30 years-and that if, upon conviction, he gets anything less

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol41/iss2/9

8

Pettit: Writing the Book[er] on Blakely: The Challenge to the Federal Sen

2005]

THE CHALLENGE TO THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

373

Justice Scalia's dissenting opinions 104 have come to be the majority opinion expressed in
Blakely: that no defendant shall be deprived of liberty for any longer than the maximum
10 5
Justice
sentence allowed by the jury's findings of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
10 6
State,
the
to
defendants
of
fate
the
entrust
to
want
not
Scalia made it plain that he did
of which the judiciary is a part. 107 At the end of the Court's Blakely opinion, Justice
Scalia noted,

Petitioner was sentenced to prison for more than three years beyond what the law
allowed for the crime to which he confessed, on the basis of a disputed finding that he had
acted with "deliberate cruelty." The Framers would not have thought it too much to
demand that, before depriving a man of three more years of his liberty, the State should
suffer the modest inconvenience of submitting its accusation to "the unanimous108suffrage of
twelve of his equals and neighbours," rather than a lone employee of the State.

than that he may thank the mercy of a tenderhearted judge .... Will there be disparities? Of
course. But the criminal will never get more punishment than he bargained for when he did the
crime, and his guilt of the crime (and hence the length of the sentence to which he is exposed) will
be determined beyond a reasonabledoubt by the unanimous vote of 12 of hisfellow citizens.
530 U.S. at 498 (emphasis in original) (Scalia, J., concurring). In 1999, Justice Scalia contended that "it is
unconstitutional to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that alter the congressionally prescribed range
of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed." Jones v. U.S., 526 U.S. 227, 253 (1999) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Dissenting in Monge v. California,he asked:
Suppose that a State repealed all of the violent crimes in its criminal code and replaced them with
only one offence, "knowingly causing injury to another," bearing a penalty of 30 days in prison, but
subject to a series of "sentencing enhancements" authorizing additional punishment up to life
imprisonment or death on the basis of various levels of mens rea, severity of injury, and other
surrounding circumstances. Could the State then grant the defendant a jury trial, with requirement
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, solely on the question whether he "knowingly cause[d] injury
to another," but leave it for the judge to determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether the
defendant acted intentionally or accidentally, whether he used a deadly weapon, and whether the
victim ultimately died from the injury the defendant inflicted?
524 U.S. 721, 738 (1998) (bracket in original) (Scalia, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). He asserted that for
constitutional purposes, when a defendant was found guilty of a crime carrying a maximum sentence of seven
years, but sentenced to eleven years as a result of sentencing enhancements, the additional four-year sentence
constituted conviction of a new crime. Id.at 740-41. In Almendarez-Torres, Justice Scalia contended that "[i]t
would not be, as the Court claims, 'anomalous' to require jury trial for a factor increasing the maximum
sentence." Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 257 n. 2 (Scalia, Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
104. See e.g. Mange, 524 U.S. at 738, 740-41; Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 248. Scalia observed:
That it is genuinely doubtful whether the Constitution permits a judge (rather than a jury) to
determine by a mere preponderance of the evidence (rather than beyond a reasonable doubt) a fact
that increases the maximum penalty to which a criminal defendant is subject is clear enough from
our prior cases resolving questions on the margins of this one.
Id. at 251.
105. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2536-37, 2543.
106. Id. at 2538-39 ("[The right to a jury trial] is no mere procedural formality, but a fundamental
reservation of power in our constitutional structure. Just as suffrage ensures the people's ultimate control in the
at 2539 n. 10
legislative and executive branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary."); id.
("[T]he Framers' decision to entrench the jury-trial right in the Constitution shows that they did not trust
govemment to make political decisions in this area."); id. at 2540 ("[Tlhe very reason the Framers put a
jury-trial guarantee in the Constitution is that they were unwilling to trust govemment to mark out the role of
the jury.").
107. Id.at 2543 ("There is not one shred of doubt, however, about the Framers' paradigm for criminal
justice: not the civil-law ideal of administrative perfection, but the common-law ideal of limited state power
accomplished by strict division of authority between judge and jury.").
108. Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2543 (citation omitted).
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The Dissenting Opinions

In stark contrast, the dissent in Blakely believed that the decision would
consolidate sentencing power in both state and federal judiciaries, since legislatures were
10 9
apt to either significantly modify or completely abandon their sentencing guidelines.
The result would increase both judicial discretion and disparity in sentencing.I 1 0 This
disparity in sentencing is precisely what led to the adoption of sentencing guidelines by
Washington in 1981.111 The same concerns led other states and the federal government
to enact guidelines systems. 112 The majority opinion in Blakely, according to the
dissenters "casts constitutional doubt over them all" and will "wreak [havoc] on trial
' 1 13
courts across the country."
Having concerns beyond disparity in sentencing and havoc wrought on trial courts,
Justice Breyer wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which he outlined several possible
options legislatures might take regarding sentencing. 114 He concluded, "[T]he design of
any fair sentencing system must involve efforts to make practical compromises among
competing goals. The majority's reading of the Sixth Amendment makes the effort to
find those compromises-already difficult-virtually impossible."' 15
Countering Justice Scalia's reliance on the historical roots of the right to a jury
trial, Justice Breyer offered additional historical perspective, noting, "Neither Bishop nor
any other historical treatise writer ... disputes the proposition that judges historically
had discretion to vary the sentence, within the range provided by the statute, based on
facts not proved at the trial."'1 16 Further, since structured sentencing schemes did not
exist in the nineteenth century, history is silent regarding the practice. 117 Rather than
violating the Sixth Amendment's assurance of the right to a jury trial, Justice Breyer
argued that structured sentencing guidelines "enhance] and giv[e] meaning to the Sixth
Amendment's jury trial right as to core crimes, while affording additional due process to
defendants in the form of sentencing hearings before judges-hearings the majority's
1 18
rule will eliminate for many."
The dissent took issue with the majority's definition of "statutory maximum
sentence." According to the majority, the "statutory maximum sentence" is limited to
the maximum sentence that can be imposed without additional findings.1 19 The dissent
maintained that the "statutory maximum sentence" is the sentence set by the legislature
for the crime.' 20 Dissenters feared that the change in definition would spell the end for

109.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 2543 (O'Connor dissent).
Id.
Id. at 2544.
Id. at 2548-49.
Blakely, 124 U.S. at 2549.
Id.at 2551-60 (Breyer, J., dissenting, in which O'Connor, J., joined [hereinafter (Breyer dissent)]).
115. Id. at 2558.
116. Id.at 2559.
117. Id. at 2559-60.
118. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2560 (Breyer dissent).
119. Id. at 2537 (majority opinion).
120. Id. at 2547 (O'Connor dissent) ("Washington's Sentencing Reform Act did not alter the statutory
maximum sentence to which petitioner was exposed. Petitioner was informed in the charging document, his
plea agreement, and during his plea hearing that he faced a potential statutory maximum of 10 years in
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both state and federal sentencing guidelines as they currently existed, since "[i]f the
Washington scheme does not comport with the Constitution, it is hard to imagine a
1 21
guidelines scheme that would."
III.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES: FEDERAL AND STATE OF WASHINGTON

Two primary questions were considered to try to predict whether the rule of
Blakely would be extended to invalidate provisions in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
requiring judges to enhance sentences based on facts neither presented to a jury nor
considered by it, but instead found by the judges themselves. First, could the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines be sufficiently distinguished from the Washington guidelines to
limit Blakely's reach? Second, if they could not, must the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
fall in their entirety, as unconstitutional, or could they be preserved by severing portions
deemed unconstitutional?
A.

Distinguishingthe Sentencing Guidelines

The position of the Department of Justice, 122 and that of the United States
Sentencing Commission, 123 was that the federal guidelines system was distinguishable
from that in Washington, thereby protecting it from the reach of Blakely. Despite a
contrary position in the government's amicus brief in Blakely, 124 the Solicitor General,
in Booker and Fanfan, took the position that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were
distinguishable from those in Washington. 125 He based this distinction on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines' having been written by the U.S. Sentencing Commission rather
than by Congress, while the state sentencing guidelines in Washington were enacted into
126
law by the state legislature.
128
The dissent in Blakely127 and the United States in its amicus brief in Blakely
found no important differences between the two systems and asserted that if the
Washington system violated the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, so did the
federal system. While the majority in Blakely took no position regarding the Federal
Guidelines, noting, "The Federal Guidelines are not before us, and we express no
opinion on them,"' 129 it seemed unlikely that the Court would be able to find a significant

prison."); id. at 2559 (Breyer dissent) ("In this case, the statute provides that kidnapping may be punished by
up to 10 years' imprisonment.").
121. Id. at 2550 (O'Connor dissent); Blakely, 124 U.S. at 2561 (Breyer dissent) ("Perhaps the Court will
distinguish the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, but I am uncertain how.").
122. Memo. from James Comey, supran. 10, at 1-2.
123. Br. of Amicus Curiae U.S. Senten. Commn. at 10-11, Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (available at 2004
WL 1950330 at **10-11).
124. Br. of U.S. as Amicus Curiae at 29-30, Blakely, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (available at 2004 WL 177025
at **29-30).
125. Petr. Br. at 12, 14-38, Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (The United States filed only one brief for the
consolidated cases.) (available at 2004 WL 1967056 at ** 12, 14-38).
126. Id.
127. 124 S. Ct. at 2549-50 (O'Connor dissent); id. at 2561 (Breyer dissent).
128. Id. at 2538 n. 9 (majority opinion).
129. Id.
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distinction between the statutory guidelines in Washington and the administrative
Federal Guidelines. 130
1.

History and Authority of the Guidelines

The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, usually referred to as the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, were promulgated as a result of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984131 and
went into effect November 1, 1987.132 Until then, similar crimes could earn defendants
widely disparate sentences, depending in large part on the discretion of individual
judges. 133 In an effort to combat such inconsistency, 134 Congress authorized the U.S.
135
Sentencing Commission to devise a system to be used in sentencing.
With similar motivation, the State of Washington, three years earlier, had passed
its own Sentencing Reform Act. 136 This act established a Sentencing Guidelines
Commission that was charged with developing guidelines for determinate sentencing for
adults. 137 Under the Washington law, the guidelines that were developed by the
138
commission were then recommended to the legislature for adoption by statute.
Enacted by the state's legislature in 1983, Washington's sentencing guidelines became
effective in 1984.139 Since then, they have been amended by the state's legislature in
nearly every session. 14 ° Such frequent amendments may compromise uniformity in
sentencing since two defendants' sentences may differ based on which guidelines were
in effect when they were sentenced.
Unlike Washington's state sentencing guidelines, the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines are not submitted to Congress to be adopted by statute. Instead, in the federal
sentencing scheme, Congress determines the maximum sentence for particular crimes
and the Sentencing Commission establishes guidelines to be used to determine the actual
sentence. 14 1 The original Federal Guidelines became effective November 1, 1987 and in
each succeeding year, amendments to those Guidelines have become effective each
November 1. While neither the original Guidelines, nor the amendments, have required

130. Kevin R. Reitz, Model Penal Code: Sentencing Report to the Council 10 (October 7, 2004) (available
at http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencinglaw-and_policy/files/mpcreport to-the-council 2004_for blog
.doc) (last accessed Apr. 10, 2006) ("Most observers think it unlikely that the Court will find any constitutional
distinction between statutory and administrative guidelines, and some even consider the argument frivolous.").
131. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984).
132. Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics ofSentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 28 Wake Forest L. Rev. 223, 228 (1993).
133. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2554 (Breyer dissent); Interview by Talk of the Nation with James Comey, Dep.
Atty. Gen. (NPR Aug. 3, 2004) (radio broadcast, transcr. available at http://www.npr.org/transcripts).
134. U.S. Senten. Commn., Fifteen Years of Guidelines Sentencing: An Assessment of How Well the Federal
CriminalJustice System is Achieving the Goals of Sentencing Reform iv, http://www.ussc.gov/l5_year/l5_
year studyfull.pdf (Nov. 2004).
135. 98 Stat. at 2017.
136. Wash. St. Senten. Commn., Sentencing Reform Act: HistoricalBackground, http://www.sgc.wa.gov/
Informational/historical.htm (last accessed Apr. 28, 2006).
137. Id. The commission's duties expanded to include juvenile sentencing in 1996. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Wash. St. Senten. Commn., supra n. 136.
141. Congress has also established "mandatory minimum" sentences for some crimes.
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142
explicit approval by Congress, they are, nonetheless, controlled by Congress.

Congress may change the Guidelines at any time. 143 Recently, as part of the 2003
PROTECT Act, 144 Congress directly amended the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. This
amendment, known as the Feeney Amendment, after its author, Representative Tom
Feeney, 145 significantly restricted judges' discretion to depart downward from the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines 14 6 and changed the standard for appellate review of
47
sentencing to de novo.1
2.

The Basic Workings of the Guidelines

Designed to bring uniformity to sentencing, the state sentencing guidelines in
Washington use the seriousness of the offense and the criminal history of the offender to
arrive at a "standard" or "presumptive" sentencing range.148 The upper end of this range
149
is what the Supreme Court defined as the "statutory maximum sentence" in Blakely.
The Washington guidelines allowed the trial court to deviate from the presumptive
' 150
sentence "[w]hen substantial and compelling reasons exist."
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines comprise an elaborate factoring grid under
which points are added for the presence of various factors. These factors include prior
convictions, use of a gun in the commission of a crime, quantity of illegal drugs
151
possessed, 1 1 and whether the defendant was the leader in a conspiracy. 152 As with the
guidelines in Washington, the goal has been to bring uniformity to sentencing so that
similar crimes, committed in similar ways, by similarly situated defendants receive
similar sentences.
3.

"Real Facts Doctrine" and "Real Conduct" or "Real Offense"

One specific difference between the two sets of guidelines is Washington's "real
facts doctrine."' 153 Washington law will not allow judges to impose sentences based on
facts that would either establish a more serious crime than the one for which the
defendant was convicted, or establish additional crimes for which the defendant had not

142. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2549 (O'Connor dissent) ("Congress has unfettered control to reject or accept any
particular guideline.").
143. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2000); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 393-94 ("[T]he Commission is fully accountable
to Congress, which can revoke or amend any or all of the Guidelines as it sees fit.").
144. ProsecutorialRemedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).
145. Republican United States Representative from Florida.
146. The Feeney Amendment limits judicial discretion to depart downward from presumptive sentences and
provides for information gathering on a judge by judge basis to track downward departures.
147. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 786 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part, in which Souter, J., joined, and in which
Scalia, J., joined except for Part Ill and footnote 17 [hereinafter (Stevens dissent from remedial opinion)]).
148. Wash. St. Senten. Commn., supra n. 136.
149. 124 S. Ct. at 2537 (majority opinion).
150. Wash. St. Senten. Commn., supra n. 136.
151. Shamblin, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 760-61. In drug cases, quantities of other drugs are equated to generally
larger quantities of marijuana. Id. at 761.
152. Fanfan, 2004 WL 1723114 at *2.
153. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2550 (O'Connor dissent); Blakely, 47 P.3d at 158.
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been convicted. 154 In contrast, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines not only allow such
155
facts, but also encourage them.
One provision for which upward departures from presumptive sentences under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines is for the "real conduct" or "real offense." This is the
way in which a sentence could be enhanced under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
from a 262-month sentence based on a conviction for "possessing with intent to
distribute at least 50 grams of cocaine base" 156 to a 360-month sentence after additional
fact finding by the judge. 1 57 Based on presentencing reports, not subject to the rules of
evidence or cross examination, 158 judges have found it more likely than not that a
defendant had possessed and/or trafficked a larger amount of methamphetamine, 159 or
possessed both cocaine powder and cocaine base (crack cocaine). 160 Similarly, increases
in sentencing may occur in crimes involving money, where a judge determines the total
amount of money involved and thereby increases the sentence. 161 Uncharged conduct
has increased one-half of all sentences according to one study. 162 Since the burden of
proof is lower for determining "relevant conduct" than for conviction, 163 even acquitted
64
charges have been used to enhance sentences. 1
This difference between Washington's state sentencing guidelines and the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines was unlikely to prevent application of Blakely to the Federal
Guidelines. Justice O'Connor, in her Blakely dissent, said that rather than making the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines immune to Blakely, the differences that exist between the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and those in Washington make the Blakely decision more
65
likely to apply to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 1
B.

Severability

A statute or provision of Congress can sometimes be salvaged through severability
when the Court judges the statute or provision unconstitutional. If the Court can find a
way to sever the unconstitutional portions, the remainder may stand as valid. Congress
may include a severability clause to make it clear to the courts that it wants the statues
salvaged even if parts are found unconstitutional. However, failure to include a
66
severability clause does not tip the balance in favor of non-severability. 1

154. SeeBlakely, 47 P.3d at 158.
155. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2557 (Breyer dissent).
156. Booker, 375 F.3d at 509; see also id. at 510.
157. Booker, 375 F.3d at 509.
158. Br. of Amicus Curiae for the Wash. Leg. Found. & Allied Educ. Found. at 8, Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738
(available at 2004 WL 2112281 at *8) [hereinafter D.C. Br.].
159. See e.g. Ameline, 376 F.3d at 969.
160. See e.g. Pineiro, 377 F.3d at 466-67; Booker, 375 F.3d at 509.
161. D.C. Br. at 9-10, Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (available at 2004 WL 2112281 at **9-10).
162. Id.at **8-9 (citing Rachel E.Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The CriminalJury's ConstitutionalRole in
an Era of MandatorySentencing, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 33, 94 (2003)).
163. Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 523, 524,
548 (1993).
164. Barry L. Johnson, If at First You Don't Succeed-Abolishing the Use of Acquitted Conduct in
Guidelines Sentencing,75 N.C. L. Rev. 153, 154-55 (1996); Reitz, supra n. 163, at 546.
165. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2549 (O'Connor dissent).
166. Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely, 16 Fed. Senten. Rpt. 316, 318 (quoting Alaska
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16 7
The Federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 contains no severability clause.
Generally, however, severability is favored because the Court "should refrain from

invalidating more of the statute than is necessary."

168

Therefore, severability is

determined by whether Congress would have passed the legislation without the portion
that would be severed. 16 9 There has been no clear-cut consensus as to whether Congress
would have passed the Sentencing Reform Act if it did not include the provision for
170
sentence enhancements based on facts found by the judge rather than by the jury.

Federal court cases after Blakely were divided on the issue.

IV.
A.

FEDERAL COURT RESPONSES TO BLAKELY

17 1

Mostly Restrained Opinionsfrom the Courts of Appeals

As predicted in the Blakely dissents, 172 the decision caused turmoil within the
federal courts.

Both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits held that Blakely applies to the

Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 17 3 The Sixth Circuit initially agreed, 174 but that ruling
was vacated and an en banc rehearing was ordered. 175 Before that rehearing occurred,
the defendant reached a settlement in the case and her attorney asked the Sixth Circuit to

drop the appeal. 176 A month later, the Sixth Circuit held that Blakely did not require a
finding that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment.

177

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was the first Circuit Court to apply Blakely to
the Federal Guidelines. 178

Some of the other circuits followed suit, 179 but were less

forceful in their opinions that Blakely did not apply to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
While the Fifth Circuit reached that conclusion by its own analysis, other circuits

generally took a "wait and see" position, holding that there was no current effect on the
Guidelines and directing their district courts to continue sentencing under the Guidelines
80
as they did before Blakely.1

Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686 (1987)).
167. Id. at 318, 318 n. 44 (2004) (noting however, "A 1996 amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 3563, addressing
conditions of probation, did include a severability provision.").
168. Id. at 318 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984)
(plurality opinion)).
169. Id.
170. See id.
171. Two websites, Sentencing Law and Policy, Berman, supra n. 8, and USSGUIDE.COM,
http://www.ussguide.com/members/BulletinBoard/Blakely (last accessed Sept. 23, 2005), were particularly
helpful in keeping up with court decisions involving Blakely. The latter website no longer provides public
access; copies on file with author.
172. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2548 (O'Connor dissent); id. at 2561-62 (Breyer dissent).
173. Booker, 375 F.3d 508; Ameline, 376 F.3d 967.
174. U.S. v. Montgomery, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 14384 (6th Cir. July 14,2004).
175. U.S. v. Montgomery, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 15017 **1-2 (6th Cir. July 19, 2004).
176. USSGUIDE.COM, Blakely: Opinions and other Information, Sixth Circuit, http://www.ussguide.com/
members/BulletinBoard/Blakely/06CA/index6CA.cfm (Sept. 23, 2005) (copy on file with author).
177. Koch, 383 F.3d436.
178. Pineiro,377 F.3d at 465.
179. See e.g. U.S. v. Mincey, 380 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2004); U.S. v. Hammoud, 378 F.3d 426 (4th Cir. 2004)
(en banc, per curiam), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 1051 (2005); U.S. v. Reese, 382 F.3d 1308 (1 Ith Cir. 2004).
180. See e.g. Mincey, 380 F.3d at 106 (directing the courts of the Circuit to "continue fully to apply the
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Distinguishing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines

In the courts of appeals, there was little effort to distinguish the Federal Guidelines
from those of the state of Washington, even in those courts that found the Federal
Guidelines unaffected by Blakely. The Sixth Circuit noted that "the 'statutory
maximum' at issue in Blakely arose from a statute, and the Sentencing Guidelines are not
statutes,"18 1 but acknowledged that "both have the force of law and both bind courts. 1 82
While it questioned whether being promulgated by an agency would prove to be a
sufficient distinction to save the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in the cases before the
U.S. Supreme Court, 183 the court concluded, "it at least undermines the view that
' 184
Blakely compels us to invalidate the Sentencing Guidelines."
The Fifth Circuit opinion was somewhat more forceful. 185 Asserting that prior
Court cases have noted "constitutionally meaningful differences between Guidelines
ranges and United States Code maxima,"' 186 Chief Judge King said, "[W]e cannot
conclude that Blakely--which explicitly reserved comment on the Guidelines-has
187
abolished the distinction's importance."
When Freddie Joe Booker took his appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Judge
Easterbrook found that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were unaffected by the Blakely
decision. 18 8 Noting that both Apprendi and Blakely use the phrase "statutory
maximum" '189 and that "Blakely arose from a need to designate one of two statutes as the
'statutory maximum, ' 190 he took the position that the "statutory maximum" at the
federal level refers to the maximum provided in the United States Code rather than the
19 1
maximum provided in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.
2.

Severability

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was the first Circuit to hold that the Blakely
holding affected the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 192 Soon thereafter, the Ninth

Guidelines" "unless and until the Supreme Court rules otherwise"); Hammoud, 378 F.3d at 426 (directing the
district courts to continue sentencing under the Guidelines as pre-Blakely); Reese, 382 F.3d at 1312 ("In light
of... the Supreme Court's express avoidance of this issue with respect to the Guidelines in the Blakely opinion
itself, we decline to conclude that Blakely compels an alteration of the established view of the Guidelines as a
tool for channeling the sentencing court's discretion within a crime's minimum and maximum sentence
provided in the United States Code, with that maximum being the only constitutionally relevant maximum
sentence.... [D]istrict courts should continue to sentence pursuant to the Guidelines until such time as the
Supreme Court rules on this issue.").
181. Koch, 383 F.3d at 441.
182. Id.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Pineiro,377 F.3d 464.
Id. at 470.
Id. at 473.

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Booker, 375 F.3d at 519 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at518.
id. at 517-19.
Id. at 510 (majority opinion).
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Circuit followed suit. 193 Each court stopped short of finding the Guidelines wholly
unconstitutional.
The Booker court remanded the case for resentencing but made no decision
regarding severability, stating "that is an issue for consideration on remand should it be
made an issue by the parties." 194 Noting that the Department of Justice "believes that if
Blakely is applicable to the guidelines, the 'entire system' of the guidelines 'must
fall," '" 195 the court acknowledged that it was possible that "the requirement that the
sentencing judge make certain findings that shall operate as the premise of the sentence
and that he make them on the basis of the preponderance of the evidence, may not be
severable from the substantive provisions of the guidelines."' 19 6 The court speculated
that Congress might abandon determinate sentencing in favor of a return to indeterminate
sentencing if the result of determinate sentencing was shorter average sentences due to a
requirement that facts enhancing a sentence had to be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. 197
The Ameline court found that the provisions violating the Blakely holding were
severable. 19 8 Asserting that severance would not hinder Congress's goal to produce
consistency in sentencing, Judge Paez wrote, "[W]ere we to hold that Blakely precludes
application of the Guidelines as a whole, we would do far greater violence to Congress'
199
intent than if we merely excised the unconstitutional procedural requirements."'
B.

District Court Responses

While the courts of appeals, for the most part, took a rather passive "wait and see"
position, the district courts were more vocal. 2 0 Perhaps this should have been expected.
It is the district courts that have the responsibility of imposing sentences under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Many of the district judges have used the Guidelines
20 1
throughout their entire career on the federal bench.
The courts' approaches varied greatly. While some held that Blakely did not
render the Federal Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional, 2° 2 many held that Blakely

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Ameline, 376 F.3d at 967-70.
Booker, 375 F.3d at 515.
Id. at 514-15 (citing Memo. from James Comey, supra n. 10, at 3).
Id. at 515.
See id.
376 F.3d at 980-81.

199. Id. at 982.
200. See e.g. U.S. v. Toro, 335 F. Supp. 2d 268 (D. Conn. 2004); Zompa, 326 F. Supp. 2d 176; Fanfan, 2004
WL 1723114; Mueffelman, 327 F. Supp. 2d 79; Sisson, 326 F. Supp. 2d 203; Landgarten,325 F. Supp. 2d 235;
U.S. v. Khan, 325 F. Supp. 2d 218 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); Medas, 323 F. Supp. 2d 436; US. v. Emmenegger, 329
F. Supp. 2d 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); US. v. Marrero, 325 F. Supp. 2d 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); U.S. v. Einstman,
325 F. Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
201. Einstman, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 381.
202. See e.g. U.S. v. Paris, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16401 at *4 (D. Kan. July 27, 2004) (agreeing with
Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464, and saying it would "announce alternative sentences in the event that Blakely is finally

determined to have some impact on federal sentences"); U.S. v. Olivera-Hernandez, 328 F. Supp. 2d 1185,
1187 (D. Utah 2004) (finding "that Blakely and its reasoning do not (yet) apply to the federal sentencing
statutes").

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2005

17

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 41 [2005], Iss. 2, Art. 9

TULSA LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 41:365

rendered the Federal Sentencing Guidelines wholly unconstitutional. 20 3 Still others
found that, while there might be unconstitutional provisions in the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, those provisions could be severed from the whole, leaving at least part of the
Guidelines intact. 20 4 Decisions discussing severability were split in how they would
sever the Guidelines and which parts would remain viable.
1.

Distinguishing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines

As in the courts of appeal, there was little attempt to distinguish the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines from those in Washington. While acknowledging that the Federal
Guidelines are generally written by a commission rather than a legislative body, most
courts saw that as an illusory distinction. One judge, however, announced that the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines would be applied as they had been before Blakely and
pointed out that "the Sentencing Guidelines may ... defy present expectations of their
impending demise. A distinction, however fine, may be drawn between the Federal
Guidelines and the State of Washington's20Guidelines.
Other issues could become
5
involved. A vote could switch. And so on."
2.

Severability

Some district courts found that if Blakely applied to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, the Guidelines must fall entirely. Other courts found that severing the
portion that made them unconstitutional could salvage the Guidelines. For some of these
courts, 206 the solution was to continue using the Guidelines for all sentencing without
imposing any sentences longer than the presumptive maximums. 2 07 This generally
meant that these judges were imposing sentences without upward departures, though at

203. See e.g. King, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 1278; U.S. v. Carter,2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14433 at **3-4 (C.D. Il1.
July 23, 2004); Mueffelman, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 82; Sisson, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 205; Marrero,325 F. Supp. 2d
at 456; Einstman, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 375 (holding "the necessary implication of Blakely is that the [U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines] as they currently exist must be unconstitutional"); id. at 380 ("1 agree wholeheartedly
with the Government's position that the [U.S. Sentencing Guidelines] are not severable, so the
unconstitutionality of the provisions concerning the judicial factfinding of sentencing enhancements necessarily
means that the entire [U.S. Sentencing Guidelines] scheme falls."); U.S. v. Harris,325 F. Supp. 2d 562, 563-64
(W.D. Pa. 2004).
204. E.g. Zompa, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 178; Fanfan, 2004 WL 1723114 at *5 ("I conclude that perhaps the
Supreme Court can find a way to explain away Blakely in its language and its reasoning, but as a trial Judge
and a sentencing Judge, I cannot. I must take it as it is written. I will leave it to higher courts to tell me it does
not mean exactly what it says.... [F]ollowing Blakely, I conclude that it is unconstitutional for me to apply
the federal guideline enhancements."); Khan, 325 F. Supp. 2d 218, 219-20 (citations omitted) ("Blakely does
not-as some have speculated-constitute the death knell of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Blakely does
provide Congress, the courts and the Sentencing Commission with an opportunity and obligation to reevaluate
and revise the Guidelines.... Blakely's reintroduction of the jury into the present sentencing process suggests
the desirability of making the Guidelines discretionary guideposts-as their name implies-rather than
mandatory precepts, inflexible commands."); Shamblin, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 766-68; id. at 768 (determining to
impose only the maximum presumptive sentence without enhancements, "[a]t 240 months, Shamblin's
sentence represented much that is wrong about the Sentencing Guidelines; at 12 months, it is almost certainly
inadequate. My duty, however, is only to apply the law as I find it.").
205. Olivera-Hernandez,328 F. Supp. 2d at 1187.
206. See e.g. Toro, 335 F. Supp. 2d 268; Zompa, 326 F. Supp. 2d 176; Fanfan, 2004 WL 1723114;
Landgarten, 325 F. Supp. 2d 235; Montgomery, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1266; Shamblin, 323 F. Supp. 2d 757.
207. "Statutory maximum," by the Blakely definition, is the maximum sentence that could be imposed under
the Guidelines using only facts found by a jury or pled to by the defendant.
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least one judge opted for empanelling a sentencing jury to determine the facts necessary
for enhancement. 208 For other courts, severability essentially meant using the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines only for those sentences in which enhancement was not an issue
and returning to indeterminate sentencing for the others. 20 9 This was the approach used
2 10

in United States v. Croxford.
Croxford was one of the first post-Blakely district court decisions, coming just five
days after the Blakely decision. 2 11 In it, Judge Paul Cassell found that Blakely applied to
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, rendering them entirely unconstitutional as applied to
sentences enhanced due to judge-found facts. 2 12 He outlined three possible paths a court
might take in such a case and determined that the "only viable one' 2 13 was to return to
indeterminate sentencing. He then handled the sentencing of the defendant "as the courts
handled sentencing before the Guidelines--by making a full examination of the relevant
evidence and imposing an appropriate sentence within the broad range set by
Congress. ' 2 14 Although he abandoned the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in Croxford,
Judge Cassell later imposed a Guidelines sentence in United States v. Thompson 2 15 and
said that where there were no enhancements based on judge-found facts, there was no
2 16
constitutional issue.
V.

PRE-BOOKER PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE OF SENTENCING

In the aftermath of Blakely, dialogue opened regarding sentencing and "present[ed]
a remarkable opportunity to build upon the federal sentencing reform experiences of the
last two decades." 2 17 Unfortunately, the proposals were not terribly imaginative.

208. See Landgarten,325 F. Supp. 2d at 235-36.
209. See e.g. Thompson, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1273; Croxford, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12156.
210. 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12156.
211. Fanfan, 2004 WL 1723114, was decided one day earlier and with a very different outcome-sentencing
the defendant to 78 months, the "relevant statutory maximum" for the jury verdict, rather than the 188 to 235
month range which enhancements would have rendered under the Guidelines without Blakely. On June 30,
2004, the Sisson court announced the court's return to drawing criminal cases and stated that
it shall treat the Guidelines as unconstitutional in all cases ....In other words, in all cases, the
Court shall handle the sentencing as courts handled sentencing before the Guidelines-by making a
full examination of an individual defendant's personal character, family responsibilities, medical
and mental condition, criminal record, and the particular circumstances surrounding the crime and
imposing an appropriate sentence within the broad range set by Congress, after deep reflection
informed by his experience in life and in the law.... The Guidelines are to be considered as
guidelines and not as mandates which have destroyed traditional judicial discretion.
326 F. Supp. 2d at 205 (citations omitted).
212. Croxford,2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12156 at **22, 31.
213. Id.at**33-34.
214. Id.at*40.
215. 324 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (D. Utah 2004).
216. Id.at 1275-76.
217. Douglas A. Berman et al., Sen. Comm. on Jud., Written Test., Go Slow: A Recommendation for
Responding to Blakely v. Washington in the Federal System 1 (July 13, 2004) (available at
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencinglaw-and-policy/files/final-bermanmillerdemleitnerwright-blakely_
sen.%20Jud.%2OComm.%2OTestimony/o20%20(7.13.04).pdf).
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From Blakely

In his dissent in Blakely, Justice Breyer set out three options for sentencing after
Blakely: (1) a determinate sentencing system in which each crime would carry the same
sentence without variation; 2 18 (2) an indeterminate sentencing system as existed before
sentencing reform wherein time served was at the discretion of the judge and parole
boards; 2 19 and (3) a sentencing system with guidelines from which judges could depart
downward, but under which no upward departures could be made unless aggravating
facts had been proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 2 0 Justice Breyer dismissed
a possible fourth option, previously set out by Justice O'Connor in Apprendi.221 Under
that option, legislatures wou!d rewrite their statutes to incorporate very high sentences
and provide mitigating rather than aggravating factors that would allow downward
2 22
departures from the high presumptive sentences.
None of these proposed solutions met with Justice Breyer's approval. The
determinate system "assures uniformity, but at intolerable costs ' 2 23 because it would
lose the flexibility "to treat different cases differently. ' ' 224 Additionally, prosecutors
would have more power to manipulate sentencing and put further pressure on defendants
to reach plea agreements. 225 The second option, a return to indeterminate sentencing,
would bring the hazards of tremendous sentencing disparities, while providing no
protection to defendants and no assurance that their fate would be determined by a
22 6
jury.
Justice Breyer was most critical of the third option-using juries to determine facts
needed for upward departures from the presumptive sentence. This option could also
involve redefining crimes to include various sentencing factors-a "'complex charge
offense' system." 227 According to Justice Breyer, this system would put defendants at a
disadvantage both in plea bargaining and at trial, particularly if states required
228
defendants to either plea to all elements charged or proceed to trial.
Providing juries
to determine the facts needed for enhanced sentencing was deemed too costly and
unwieldy. 229 Further, it could only be workable if the rate of plea agreements remained
high. 230 Justice Breyer observed, "I do not understand how the Sixth Amendment could
require a sentencing system that will work in practice only if no more than a handful of
23 1
defendants exercise their right to a jury trial."

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2552-53 (Breyer dissent).
Id.at 2553-54.
Id. at 2554.
Id. at 2558 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 541-42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
Id. at 2558.
Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2553.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2554.
Id. at 2555.
Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2555.
Id. at 2556.
Id. at 2556-57.
Id. at 2557 (emphasis in original).
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2 32

Soon after Blakely was decided, Professor Frank Bowman 233 sent a memorandum
to the U.S. Sentencing Commission 234 suggesting what has become known as the
"Bowman Fix." 23 5 The memorandum proposed that sentence ranges under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines be increased to the maximum sentence set by Congress for each
crime. 236 The purported effect would be to return the functioning of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines to nearly the same way in which they functioned before
Blakely.23 7 Professor Bowman suggested that the Commission might recommend that
2 38
sentences generally not exceed the minimum sentence by more than 25% or 6 months
unless there was at least one factor present that is currently included in the Guidelines as
a reason for an upward departure. 239 This recommendation would not be binding and
failure to follow the recommendation would not be appealable. 24° This lack of
24 1
appealability might protect the revised Guidelines from the reach of Blakely.
If judges were to follow the non-binding recommendation that sentence not exceed
25% of the minimum sentence, the Bowman Fix would effectively maintain the
pre-Blakely status quo. However, judges would not be required to do so; therefore, the
Bowman Fix is, in reality, a return to indeterminate sentencing wherein judges handle
sentencing "as [they did] before the Guidelines-by making a full examination of the
relevant evidence and imposing an appropriate sentence within the broad range set by
Congress. ' 242 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines would be merely advisory. Viewed
this way, it is difficult to see how the Bowman Fix is any different from the proposals of
those who would see the Guidelines fall in their entirety.
The essential flaw in the Bowman Fix is that it circumvents the philosophy of
Blakely rather than finding a way that determinate sentencing "can be implemented in a
way that respects the Sixth Amendment." 24 3 Blakely and Apprendi were about a
defendant's right to know the cost of his crime at the time he was committing it and his
right to have a jury find the facts used to deprive him of liberty. Even if the non-binding

232. While his proposal has been called the "Bowman Fix" by many, Professor Frank Bowman prefers to
call them "topless guidelines." U.S. Senten. Commn., Blakely and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Public
Hearing, Panel Two (Nov. 17, 2004) (available at http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/l117 04/111704paneltwo.pdf).
233. M. Dale Palmer Professor of Law at Indiana University School of Law.

234. Memo. from Frank Berman, Prof., Ind. Univ. Sch. L., to U.S. Senten. Commn., Blakely v. Washington
7-8 (June 27, 2004) (available at http://www.ussguide.com/members/BulletinBoard/Blakely/FrankBowman06-

27-04.pdf) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Memo. from Frank Berman].
235. Douglas A. Berman, Sentencing Law and Policy, The Brewing Battle Over the Bowman Fix,

http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencinglaw-and_.policy/2004/1 l/the brewing bat.htmI (Nov. 18, 2004).
236. Memo. from Frank Berman, supra n. 234, at 7-8.
237. Id. at 7.
238. This is the way in which current sentencing ranges are determined under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines-the top of the range is no more than 25% or 6 months greater than the lower end. 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(b)(2) (2000).

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Memo. from Frank Berman, supra n. 234, at 8.
Id.
Id.
Croxford, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12156 at *40.
Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2540 (majority opinion).
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nature of the "25% rule" 244 under the Bowman Fix did not create sufficient right in the
defendant to that maximum sentence, it would create uncertainty regarding the cost of
the crime, defeating Blakely's goal.
Further, while the Bowman Fix might seem to preserve the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, it would allow judges a range of discretion that the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines were meant to curtail. Under Professor Bowman's proposal, judges would
operate with a non-binding recommendation that they limit their sentences to the 25%
rule. It is essential to his proposal that this recommendation be non-binding; otherwise,
it could again lead to presumptive sentences being deemed to be the relevant statutory
maximum. 245
Yet, the lack of appellate review for failure to adhere to the
recommendation and the broad range of sentencing options between the minimum
Guidelines sentence and the maximum set by Congress would set the stage for the same
sort of judicial discretion that led to great disparity in sentencing before the Sentencing
Reform Act. Rather than actually preserving the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the
Bowman Fix might completely destroy them as they were conceived by Congress. 24 6 In
essence, the Bowman Fix is no different from proposals that would strike down the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines system and return to indeterminate sentencing in all
cases, retaining the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as mere advisory guidelines.
VI.

UNITED STATES V. BOOKER AND UNITED STATES V. FANFAN

August 2, 2004, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to two cases in which lower
247
had concluded that Blakely applied to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
judges
court
The Court consolidated the two cases into one and set aside two hours for oral argument
on the first day of its next term-October 4, 2005.248
A.

From the Seventh Circuit: United States v. Booker

A jury found Freddie Joe Booker guilty of possession of at least 50 grams of
cocaine with the intent to distribute. 24 9 Based on the jury's verdict, Booker's sentence
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines would have been 262 months. 25 Instead, the
judge sentenced him to 360 months, 25 1 98 months more than the standard range provided
for in the Guidelines. The judge based this upward departure from the presumptive
sentencing range on two things: first, he found that, in addition to possessing 92.5 grams

244. The top of the range being no more than 25% or 6 months greater than the lower end.
245. See D.C. Br. at 7-8, Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (available at 2004 WL 2112281 at **7-8); Stephanos
Bibas, Assoc. Prof., U. Iowa College L., Panel Remarks, U.S. Senten. Commn. Pub. Hrg., Panel Two, A View
from Academia (D.C., Nov. 16, 2004) (available at http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/l1_1604/111604paneltwo.pdf).
246. Cf Br. of Amicus Curiae of Nail. Assn. Crim. Def. Law. at 21-22, Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (available
at 2004 WL 2112280 at **21-22).
247. Booker, 375 F.3d 508; Fanfan,2004 WL 1723114.
248. U.S. v. Fanfan, 125 S. Ct. 12 (2004); U.S. v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 11 (2004).
249. Booker, 375 F.3d at 509.
250. Id. at51.
251. d. at 509.
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of crack, 2Booker had distributed 566 grams; second, he found that Booker had obstructed
25
justice.
The appellate court concluded that the defendant had the right to have a jury
determine the facts that had been used to enhance his sentence to 360 months. 253 It
offered two solutions: the government could agree to a sentence of 262 months, which
would require no additional fact-finding, or there could be a sentencing hearing in which
any facts used to enhance the sentence would need to be found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. 254 The court stated, "There is no novelty in a separate jury trial with
255
regard to the sentence."
B.

From the District Court of Maine: United States v. Fanfan

June 28, 2004, Judge D. Brock Homby, sitting on the bench of the United States
District Court of Maine, was in the unenviable position of being one of the first federal
256
judges to sentence a federal defendant after the Supreme Court's Blakely opinion.
Despite the ongoing debate regarding the applicability of Blakely to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, he chose to proceed with Ducan Fanfan's 2 57 sentencing, saying
that further delay would be unfair to the defendant. 258 Instead, he opted to "do the best I
' 25 9
can with the Supreme Court decision.
A jury had found the defendant guilty of a conspiracy involving 500 grams of
cocaine powder or more. 26 The court was considering a sentence of 188 to 235
months. 26 1 That was an enhanced sentence based on additional amounts of cocaine,
262
including some crack cocaine, and Fanfan's "leadership role in the conspiracy.
These "facts" were not found by the jury. 263 Although Judge Homby had his own
opinions and had made findings regarding those facts, 264 concluding that the Guidelines
range should be 188 to 235 months, he then concluded that he could not increase the
sentence beyond what would have been imposed under the Guidelines based solely on
266
the verdict 65 and limited the sentence to 78 months.
Having earlier quoted the Blakely majority opinion that "a judge [who] inflicts
punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow.., exceeds his proper

252. Id.
253. Id. at 509, 514. Judge Easterbrook dissented from the majority. See supra nn. 188-191 and
accompanying text.
254. Booker, 375 F.3d at 514.
255. Id.
256. Blakely was decided June 24, 2004.
257. There are discrepancies in the spelling of Fanfan's first name. Some documents use "Ducan," while
others use "Duncan." For the purposes of this article he will be referred to as "Ducan."
258. Fanfan,2004 WL 1723114 at *1.
259. Id.
260. Id. at *2.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Fanfan,2004 WL 1723114 at **2-3.
264. Id. at *2 (findings based on the trial, testimony, presentence report, and sentencing hearing testimony).
265. Id. at *3.
266. Id. at *5.
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authority, ' 267 Judge Homby returned to the words of that opinion, pointing out that he
was the lone employee of the State and that, in this case, the defendant would have been
26 8
deprived of much more than three more years of his liberty:
"The Framers would not have thought it too much to demand that, before depriving a man
of three more years of his liberty, the State should suffer the modest inconvenience of
submitting its accusation to 'the unanimous suffrage' 269of twelve of his equals and
neighbours' rather than a lone employee ...of the State.
270
The United States filed a notice of appeal to the First Circuit Court of Appeals.
A petition for writ of certiorari was filed with the U.S. Supreme Court on July 21,
2004.271

C.

From the Supreme Court: United States v. Booker andUnited States v. Fanfan

In granting certiorari, the Court consolidated Booker and Fanfan. Two questions
were presented to the Court:
1. Whether the Sixth Amendment is violated by the imposition of an enhanced sentence
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines based on the sentencing judge's
determination of a fact (other than a prior conviction) that was not found by the jury or
admitted by the defendant.
2. If the answer to the first question is "yes," the following question is presented: whether,
in a case in which the Guidelines would require the court to find a sentence-enhancing fact,
the Guidelines as a whole would be inapplicable, as a matter of severability analysis, such
that the sentencing court must exercise its discretion to sentence the
defendant within the
272
maximum and minimum set by statute for the offense of conviction.
Rather than issuing one opinion to answer both questions, as is usual, the Court
issued two opinions. Each addressed a different question. Only one Justice joined in
both opinions-Justice Ginsburg. To distinguish between the two opinions, the opinion
addressing the Sixth Amendment violation has been referred to as the "merits opinion,"
while the opinion addressing the remedy has been referred to as the "remedial opinion."
1.

The Merits Opinion

Unsurprisingly, on the first question, the answer was "yes" by a narrow majority.
Justices Stephens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, the same five Justices who
formed the majority opinion in Blakely, found fault with the application of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines in Booker.273 These were the same Justices who formed the bare
majority in Jones v. United States274 and Apprendi and who were part of the larger

267. Id.
at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537).
268. Fanfan, 2004 WL 1723114 at *3.

269. Id.at *3 (quoting Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2543).
270. Pet. for Cert. at 4, Fanfan, 125 S. Ct. 12 (available at 2004 WL 1638205 at *4).
271. Id.
272. Petr. Br. at I, Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (available at 2004 WL 1967056 at *1).
273. 125 S. Ct. 738, 746. "Booker" is commonly used to refer to both United States v. Booker and United
States v. Fanfan, which were consolidated into one opinion.
274. 526 U.S. 227 (1999) (considering a federal carjacking statute and holding that the degree of harm to the
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majority in Ring. Predictably, as with Blakely and Apprendi, Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Breyer, O'Connor, and Kennedy disagreed with the conclusion of the
majority regarding the applicability of the Sixth Amendment.
a.

The Majority Opinion

Finding no significant distinction between the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
the Washington system that was the focus of Blakely, the Court held that the trial court
violated Booker's right to a jury trial when it used judge-found facts to increase Booker's
sentence beyond the maximum sentence allowed under Federal Sentencing Guidelines
using only the facts found by a jury. 275 Asserting that "[i]t has been settled throughout
our history that the Constitution protects every criminal defendant 'against conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged,' 2 76 the Court continued to say that a criminal defendant
has the constitutional right to insist upon a jury's determination of his guilt for every
element of the crime. 277 The Court found the use of the term "sentencing enhancement"
unpersuasive in determining whether a fact was an element of the crime or a sentencing
factor. 278 "Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a
sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty
be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a
or a jury verdict must
2 79
reasonable doubt."
b.

The Dissenting Opinion

Justice Breyer wrote a short opinion dissenting from the merits opinion. 28° It was
the only opinion dissenting from the merits opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined in that dissent, which noted that all had
"previously explained at length why we cannot accept the Court's constitutional
2 81
analysis."
282
Disputing the majority's assertion that history supports a "right to jury trial"
regarding sentencing facts, Justice Breyer maintained that there was little historical
support for the merits opinion except in Apprendi and Blakely. 283 He harkened back to
his dissent in Blakely in pointing out the risks involved in the Court's merit opinion:
"unwieldy trials, a two-tier jury system, a return to judicial sentencing discretion, or the
284
replacement of sentencing ranges with specific mandatory sentences."

victim was not merely a sentencing provision, but was, instead, an element of the crime).
275. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746-56 (merits opinion).
276. Id. at 748 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
277. Id.(quoting U.S. v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511 (1995)).
278. Id. at 748-49 (citing Ring, 536 U.S. at 602, 605; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476,478; Jones, 526 U.S. 227).
279. Id. at 756.
280. Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 802-07 (Breyer, J., dissenting in part, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor and
Kennedy, JJ., joined [hereinafter (Breyer dissent from merits opinion)]).
281. Id. at 803.
282. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
283. Id.at 804.
284. Id.
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Additionally, while none of the dissenting opinions in Blakely (including his own)
had found a way to preserve the Federal Sentencing Guidelines by distinguishing them
from those in Washington, 285 Justice Breyer attempted to do so in his dissent in Booker,
pointing out that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are administrative rather than
statutory, while the guidelines in Washington were statutory. 2 86 Seizing upon the "real
facts doctrine" in Washington and the lack of such a doctrine in the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, Justice Breyer found a sufficient distinction to eliminate extension of Blakely
to Booker.2 8 7 In her dissent in Blakely, Justice O'Connor (who joined in Justice
Breyer's dissent to the merits opinion) had specifically referred to the "real facts
doctrine" before observing, "If the Washington scheme does not comport with the
28 8
Constitution, it is hard to imagine a guidelines scheme that would.,
2.

The Remedial Opinion

While the merits opinion was not surprising, the remedial opinion was. 289 Several
remedy options had been proposed in the face of the likelihood that Booker would extend
Blakely's reach to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 29 None of these proposals was
adopted by the Court. Instead the Court chose to make the previously mandatory Federal
2 91
Sentencing Guidelines advisory.
The remedial majority was comprised of the four dissenters from Apprendi,
Blakely, and the Booker merits opinion--Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Breyer,
Kennedy, and O'Connor-and one more: Justice Ginsburg. One might conclude that, of
the nine Justices, only Justice Ginsburg was happy with Booker since she alone joined in
each majority's opinion. She did not, however, write an opinion of her own, so there is
no real explanation of why she chose to extend the reach of Apprendi and Blakely to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and then chose to remedy the constitutional problem by
making those Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory.
a.

The Majority Opinion

While recognizing that Congress, in writing the Sentencing Reform Act,
envisioned a system of mandatory guidelines, the Court found that system an option
unavailable after the Court's merits opinion,292 stating that the "holding is fundamentally
293
inconsistent with the judge-based sentencing system that Congress enacted into law."
The Court concluded that if Congress had anticipated the jury trial requirement resulting

285. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 749 (merits opinion); see also Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2550 (O'Connor dissent); id.
at 2561 (Breyer dissent).
286. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 805 (Breyer dissent from merits opinion).
287. Id. at 807.
288. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2550.
289. See e.g. Timothy Lynch, One Cheerfor United States v. Booker, in Cato Supreme CourtReview, 20042005, at 215, 225 (Mark K. Moller ed., Cato Inst. 2005) (available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/scr/
docs/2005/usvbooker.pdf).
290. See supra pts. IV, V.
291. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756-57 (remedial opinion).
292. Id. at 767.
293. Id. at 768.
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from the merits opinion, it "would not have passed the same Sentencing Act.'294 The
Court, therefore, determined that it must excise portions of that act to comply with the
the same time "refrain[ing] from
Court's merits opinion requirement while, at 2 95
invalidating more of the statute than is necessary."
In determining that the best course was to make the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
advisory, the Court explained that historically, judges had sentenced defendants in a way
that punished the real conduct involved in a crime rather than simply the crime for which
the defendant had been convicted. 296 Using juries in the manner envisioned by most of
the merits majority-to find every fact necessary to increase the sentence range under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines-would destroy the system. 29 7 Judges could no longer
use information included in presentencing reports to increase sentences. 298 The Court
noted that this would "weaken the tie between a sentence and an offender's real
conduct." 299 The Sentencing Reform Act was enacted to reduce disparity in sentencing
30 0
and assure that similar crimes, committed in similar ways, were punished similarly.
Maintaining the ability to punish real conduct was deemed more important than
30 1
mandatory guidelines to the goal of uniformity in sentencing.
The remedy adopted by the Court rejected the primary remedy offered by the
respondents, Booker and Fanfan, 3 02 who proposed essentially the same approach as did
Justice Stevens: requiring sentencing ranges under the Federal Guidelines to be
determined by facts found by a jury. 30 3 It also rejected the remedy proposed by the
Department of Justice: making the Federal Guidelines advisory only in those cases where
judicial fact-finding was used to increase the sentence beyond the maximum sentence
based on facts found by a jury (or admitted to by the defendant). 3 04 The Court objected
to making the Guidelines binding for some cases, but not for all, and noted that the
remedy proposed by the Department of Justice was unlikely to promote uniformity in
30 5
sentencing.
b.

The Dissenting Opinions

Justice Stevens authored the primary dissenting opinion to the remedial opinion.
His dissent began by observing that neither of the Court's two opinions found either the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 or the Federal Sentencing Guidelines inherently

294. Id. at 764.
295. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Regan, 468 U.S. at 652).
296. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 760.
297. Id. at 760-63.
298. Id. at 760. Information in presentencing reports is frequently, but not always, uncovered after trial.
299. Id.
300. Id.at 759-60.
301. Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 761.
302. Id. at 769.
303. Id. at 779 (Stevens dissent from remedial opinion).
304. Id. at 768 (remedial opinion); see also Petr. Br. at 66-67, Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (asserting "[Tihe
Guidelines must rise or fall as a whole") (available at 2004 WL 1967056 at **66-67). The remedy offered by
the Department of Justice was essentially the same as had been advanced by Judge Cassell after Blakely. See
supra nn. 212-216 and accompanying text.
305. Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 768.
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unconstitutional. 306 He pointed directly at the two clauses excised by the remedial
opinion,3 °7 saying that 307
neither is "even arguably unconstitutional. ,308 Since neither is
unconstitutional, there is no authority under which the Court can excise them. 309 Calling
the remedial opinion an "extraordinary exercise of authority," 310 Justice Stevens pointed
out that no party to the cases, nor even any of the amici, had recommended invalidation
of either provision as a means of avoiding violations of the Sixth Amendment under the
3 11
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
The preferred remedy for the minority would be to require the government to
prove to a jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, any fact that was necessary to increase a
sentence under the Guidelines. 3 12 The Sixth Amendment violation in Booker could have
been avoided with no changes to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 313 Had the
question of drug quantity been presented to a jury that then found, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that Booker had been in possession of 566 grams, the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines would have authorized a sentence in the range of 324 to 405 months (based
on Booker's criminal history). 3 14 The judge could then have imposed a 360-month
sentence without violating the Sixth Amendment. 3 15 Even if he reached this sentence
based on his own findings that Booker had obstructed justice, there would have been no
violation of the Sixth Amendment because the judge-found facts would not have
increased Booker's sentence beyond the 405 months allowed by virtue of the jury's
verdict. 3 16 Justice Stevens wrote, "Thus, if the two facts, which in this case actually
established two separate crimes, had both been found by the jury, the judicial factfinding
' 3 17
that produced the actual sentence would not have violated the Constitution. "
Judge Stevens found the basis for the Court's remedy to be a questionable
assumption that Congress had not anticipated violation of the Sixth Amendment by a
system in which defendants received no jury determination of "a factual issue as
important as whether Booker possessed the additional 566 grams of crack that
exponentially increased the maximum sentence that he could receive.'318 He asserted
that even if the assumption were correct, it would not justify the Court's creating "a
systemwide remedy that Congress has already rejected and could enact on its own" if it
so chose.319 "[T]he Court's creative remedy is an exercise of legislative, rather than

306. Id. at 771 (Stevens dissent from remedial opinion).
307. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b)(1) (West Supp. 2004) (providing for mandatory application of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines); 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(e) (West 2000 & Supp. 2004) (providing for appellate
review of departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines)).
308. Id.at 771.
309. Id.at 778.
310. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 772.
311. Id. at 771.
312. Id.at 779.
313. Id.at 772.
314. Id.
315. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 772.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol41/iss2/9

28

Pettit: Writing the Book[er] on Blakely: The Challenge to the Federal Sen

2005]

THE CHALLENGE TO THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

393

320

judicial, power."
Justice Stevens noted that, since Blakely, the government had been working with
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in ways to avoid potential Sixth Amendment
violations. 32 1 If Congress was unhappy with these procedures, Congress could make
of total
changes. "Thus, there is no justification for the extreme judicial remedy
322
Guidelines."
the
or
Act]
Reform
[Sentencing
the
of
part
any
of
invalidation
Instead, Justice Stevens recommended allowing the government to continue
prosecuting cases as it had since Blakely and, through indictments and juries, prove any
facts that were needed to increase defendants' sentences. 323 Although the remedial
majority gave five reasons that this is unworkable, 324 Justice Stevens countered each
one: (1) "the court" does not necessarily refer to the judge, unconstrained by the jury's
findings, but can refer to the judge working with the jury's findings; 325 (2) judges'
ability to do "real conduct" sentencing will be unaffected except in those cases where its
goal is "contrary to the very core of Apprendi"326-"increasinga... sentence on the
basis of conduct not proved at trial"; 327 (3) since there are only a few cases where "a
Guidelines sentence would implicate the Sixth Amendment" 32 8 and most of them
involve issues like firearms, drug quantities, and other determinations that could be
easily made by juries, requiring jury findings should not be too complex; 329 (4) plea
bargains will be affected just as much by the Court's remedy as they would be by
applying Blakely to cases under mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines, possibly
more so since by making the Guidelines advisory, the Court has "eliminated the certainty
of expectations in the plea process, ' 330 and while, under Justice Stevens's remedy,
33 1
prosecutors would have discretion as to "whether to 'charge' a particular fact,"
prosecutors already exercise significant power and discretion when, in plea bargaining,
they negotiate what facts may be used at sentencing, 332 so there is no clear basis for the
assertion that prosecutorial power would be increased under Justice Stevens's remedy;
and (5) since the Constitution requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the burden of
proof for enhancements would be greater than that for reductions, however, since few
reductions have been available under the Guidelines and Guidelines ranges provide for a
great deal of judicial discretion, the effect of this increased burden is apt to be
minimal.333

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 772.
Id.at 773-76.
Id. at 776.
Id. at 779.
Id.
Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 779-80.
Id. at 780-81.
Id. at 780.
Id. at 781.
Id.
Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 781.
Id.
Id. at 782.
Id.
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Detailing the history of efforts for sentencing reform, the dissent noted, "Congress
explicitly rejected ... proposals for advisory guidelines that had been introduced in [the]
past ' 334 because its primary goal was to eliminate sentencing disparity. 33 5 That
disparity was, in large part, due to the discretion exercised by judges and parole
boards.3 36 The remedial majority's position that Congress expected sentencing
33 7
disparities to be reduced by judges' consideration of relevant conduct is inaccurate.
The Sentencing Reform Act intended a mandatory system in which judges would
consider characteristics of both the real offense and the real offender within the system's
limits.33 8 After passage of the Sentencing Reform Act, "Congress has rejected each and
every attempt to loosen the rigidity of the Guidelines or vest judges with more
sentencing options." 3 39 The 2003 PROTECT Act340 required de novo review of all
departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, making it clear that Congress
intended the Guidelines to be mandatory. 34 1 "[T]he majority has erased the heart of the
[Sentencing Reform Act] and ignored in their entirety all of the Legislative Branch's
342
post-enactment expressions of how the Guidelines are supposed to operate."
In a separate dissent, Justice Scalia observed, "The majority's remedial choice is
thus wonderfully ironic: In order to rescue from nullification a statutory scheme designed
to eliminate discretionary sentencing, it discards the provisions that eliminate
' 343
discretionary sentencing."
D.

After the Court'sHolding

While the Court's decision in Booker may provide relief to some defendants, it
provided none to either of the respondents. In Freddie Booker's case, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeal's judgment that the trial court's sentence violated the Sixth
Amendment was affirmed and remanded.34 4 In early May 2005, Booker was sentenced,
again, to 360 months in prison. 345 The Guidelines sentence previously imposed on
Ducan Fanfan by the trial court in Maine did not violate the Sixth Amendment since
Judge Hornby had chosen not to use judge-found facts to enhance the sentence, however
both parties were allowed to seek resentencing under the system of advisory
Guidelines. 346 While Fanfan fared better than Booker in terms of the actual length of his
sentence, he fared far worse when the new sentence was compared to the one he had

334. Id. at 783.
335. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 783.
336. Id.
337. See id. at 785.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 786.
340. 117 Stat. 650.
341. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 786.
342. Id. at 787.
343. Id. at 790 (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting in part).
344. Id. at 769 (remedial opinion).
345. Ed Treleven, No Benefit From His Landmark Case: Dealer Gets Same Sentence after Court Tosses
Sentencing Guidelines, Wis. St. J. A1 (May 4, 2005).
346. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769.
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received at trial. 7Previously sentenced to 78 months, in late May 2005, he was sentenced
34
to 210 months.
VII.

WEIGHING IN ON THE GUIDELINES:
348
FEDERAL COURTS' RESPONSES TO BOOKER

In the first nine months after the Booker decision, there have been questions about
how courts should implement the decision. Though the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
are now advisory rather than mandatory, the U.S. Supreme Court said that, while not
bound by the Guidelines, district courts must consider them and "take them into account
when sentencing. ' 34 9 Just how the courts are to consider the Guidelines was not
specified by the Court. The U.S. Code provides a number of factors to be considered in
sentencing:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to
provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical
care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of
defendant as set forth in the guidelines(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission...
(5) any pertinent policy statement(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission...
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
350
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.

Should the Guidelines be just one of several factors to be considered in sentencing,
weighted equally with all the others? Weighted heavily? Or should they be given
extraordinary deference and be followed in virtually all cases?

347. Gregory D. Kesich, After High Court Ruling, Dealer Gets Longer Sentence, Portland Press Herald
(Portland, Me.) BI (May 25, 2005).
348. Three sources were particularly helpful in keeping abreast of court decisions involving Booker: Frances
H. Pratt, Research & Writing Attorney, Off. Fed. Pub. Defender, Alexandria, Va., Sentences After Booker:
Imposition and Review, As of July 10, 2005, http://www.fd.org/pdf lib/Pratt%20Sentences%20After/o
20Booker2.pdf (July 10, 2005), and the two websites previously mentioned, supra n. 171.
349. Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 767.
350. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000).
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The Courts of Appeals

Thus far, the courts of appeals generally have not provided any bright-line
guidance for how much weight the district courts should accord to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. 351 With United States v. Crosby,352 the Second Circuit was the
first to deliver a post-Booker decision. 353 The court said that it would be inappropriate
for it to try to resolve all of the issues that would be facing the district courts after
Booker, even if it could identify them all. 35 4 It did identify "essential aspects of
[Booker] that concern the selection of sentences," 355 including the requirement to
consider the Guidelines along with the other factors listed and generally to determine the
applicable Guidelines range before determining a sentence, whether within or without
that range. 356 However, it did not indicate how much weight should be given to the
Guidelines, saying that it would "permit the concept of 'consideration' ... to evolve as
district judges faithfully perform their statutory duties." 357 The court noted that the
Guidelines were not a "body of casual advice, to be consulted or overlooked at the whim
of a sentencing judge," and, thus, judges must not return to the pre-Guidelines
indeterminate sentencing where judges "exercise[d] unfettered discretion to select any
sentence within the applicable statutory maximum and minimum. ''358 The court warned,
however, that "a sentencing judge would commit procedural error by mandatorily
applying the applicable Guidelines range that was based solely on facts found by a jury
359
or admitted by a defendant."
In its first post-Booker case, United States v. Mares,36 the Fifth Circuit explained
its understanding of the Supreme Court's expectations for sentencing. 36 1 When a judge
imposes a sentence "within a properly calculated Guideline range, ' 36 2 the court will
infer that all factors have been considered and the judge will provide little explanation
beyond a statement that the sentence is being imposed within the Guidelines range. 363 If
the sentence is a "non-Guidelines sentence,'364 the judge will be expected to explain, in

351. This article was written in the fall 2005. Since then, most of the circuit courts have issued decisions
involving "reasonableness review." While an examination of the cases involved would result in an entirely
new article, it seems appropriate to mention that the trend among the courts of appeals seems to be toward a
presumption that sentences within the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are reasonable. Additionally the courts
generally have found above-Guidelines sentences reasonable, while many below-Guidelines sentences have
been found unreasonable.
Douglas A. Berman, Sentencing Law and Policy, Reasonableness review
round-up.., calling Justice Scalia, http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencinglaw-andpolicy/2006/02/
reasonableness_ html (Feb. 20, 2006).
352. U.S. v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005).
353. Pratt, supra n. 348, at 3.
354. Crosby, 397 F.3d at 106.
355. Id. at 113.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id.at 113.
359. Crosby, 397 F.3d at 114 (emphasis in original).
360. 402 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2005).
361. ld.at517.
362. Id. at 519.
363. Id.
364. A "non-Guidelines" sentence is a sentence that is determined outside of the Guidelines rather than a
sentence that was determined by consulting the Guidelines and then departing up or down from them as

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol41/iss2/9

32

Pettit: Writing the Book[er] on Blakely: The Challenge to the Federal Sen
2005]

THE CHALLENGE TO THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

397

detail, the reasons for the sentence so that the court has sufficient information to review
the sentence for reasonableness. 365 Thus, apparently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
has determined that Guidelines sentences will be per se reasonable.
In United States v. Oliver,366 the Sixth Circuit found that when there were facts
supporting enhancements, while those enhancements could be applied, it was up to the
trial court to determine whether the enhancements would be applied. 367 Two months
later, the court declined to prescribe rigid procedures that district judges must follow in
post-Booker sentencing, believing that clarification would "evolve on a case-by-case
36 8
basis."
The primary guidance other circuits have provided as to how to balance the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines with the other factors they are directed to consider is
simply that, while the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, they must be consulted, and
an accurately calculated Guidelines sentence is a starting place for imposing a reasonable
sentence. Further, if the court imposes a sentence outside the Guidelines, it should
36 9
explain its reasons so that appellate review for reasonableness is facilitated.
B.

The District Courts

Quick with a response after Blakely, 370 Judge Cassell was even quicker after
Booker. The day after the Court issued its opinion in Booker, Judge Cassell entered his
decision in United States v. Wilson. 37 1 In it, he concluded that although Booker made
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory, "[i]n all but the most
unusual cases, the appropriate sentence will be the Guidelines sentence." 372 With detail,
Judge Cassell outlined "the substantive considerations that will govern sentences in this
court" 373 and then addressed procedures for future sentencing, saying that the court
374
would "continue to follow all procedural components of the Guidelines system."
Essentially, the court would continue to use pre-sentencing reports with "Guidelines
375
calculations, including calculations based on the 'real offense' involved."
Less than a week later, in United States v. Ranum,376 Judge Lynn Adelman
weighed in on the issue of just how much weight should be accorded to the Federal

provided for in the Guidelines. Id,at 519 n.7.
365. Mares, 402 F.3d at 519.
366. 397 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 2005).
367. Pratt, supra n. 348, at 4.
368. U.S. v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 383 (6th Cir. 2005).
369. See e.g. U.S. v. Gray, 405 F.3d 227, 244 n. 10 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing U.S. v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546
(4th Cir. 2005)); U.S. v. George, 403 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2005); U.S. v. Moreno-Hernandez,397 F.3d 1248,
1256 n. 10 (9th Cir. 2005); U.S. v. Robles, 408 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11 th Cir. 2005).
370. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230. Croxford, though amended July 7, 2004, was originally decided
June 29, 2004-five days after the U.S. Supreme Court issued its Blakely opinion.
371. 350 F. Supp. 2d 910 (D. Utah 2005). Wilson was handed down on January 13, 2005. Id.
372. Id. at 914.
373. Id. at 925.
374. Id.
375. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 925.
376. U.S. v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (mem.). The defendant was sentenced
January 14, 2005. Id.at 985. The Memorandum was entered January 19, 2005. Id. at 984.
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Sentencing Guidelines now that Booker had made them advisory. 3 77 In stark contrast to
Judge Cassell's view, Judge Adelman found that the Guidelines were to be considered as
only one of many sentencing factors. 378 He specifically pointed to the requirement that
courts impose a sentence that is no longer than necessary to meet the purposes set forth
within the U.S. Code. 379 While these purposes include reflecting the seriousness of the
crime, deterring criminal conduct, protecting the public from the defendant's potential
380
for future crimes, they also include effectively providing training and medical care.
Further, courts are "to consider.., the history and characteristics of the
defendant; ... the kinds of sentences available; ...[and] the need to provide restitution
to... victims." 38 1
Judge Adelman found Judge Cassell's approach in Wilson
"inconsistent with the holdings of the merits majority in Booker, rejecting mandatory
guideline sentences based on judicial fact-finding, and the remedial majority in Booker,
directing courts to consider all of the § 3353(a) factors, many of which the guidelines
3 82
either reject or ignore."
Judge Cassell was afforded an opportunity to quickly respond to Ranum after the
defendant in Wilson filed a motion to reconsider. 383 He maintained that the Guidelines
384
should be given great weight and found fault with the flexible approach in Ranum.
Offender characteristics should continue to be weighed as the Guidelines prescribe: most
offender characteristics can be considered when imposing a sentence inside the
Guidelines range, though a few-"race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and
socioeconomic status" 3 85 -should be forbidden. 386 Still others-"family ties and
responsibilities, lack of guidance as a youth" 387-should be given only moderate weight
as the Sentencing Commission has done. 388
Noting a "subtext in
Ranum... substantively disagreeing with the Guidelines severity," Judge Cassell
speculated that "objections to Guidelines nuances are, in truth, simply a basic difference
of opinion about how harshly crimes should be punished. '' 389 But determining the
harshness of punishment is a legislative prerogative. 39° Judge Cassell expressed concern
that if judges fail to exercise their newly available discretion in sentencing to further
congressional will, Congress will respond by implementing mandatory minimum
391
sentences to assure the level of punitiveness it has shown that it wants.

377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

Id. at 985-87.
Id. at 985.
Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 985 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
Id. at 985 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)).
Id.(citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (3), (7)).
Id. at 985-86.
U.S. v. Wilson, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (D. Utah 2005).
Id.at 1275.
Id. at 1277 (footnote omitted).
Id.at 1277.
Id. at 1279.
Wilson, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 1279.
Id.at 1287.
Id.
Id.at 1287-88.
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Other district courts had already begun weighing in, While the Ranum opinion
was still unpublished, Judge Robert Pratt aligned himself with the positions taken by
Judge Adelman. 392 He explained that while there was wisdom in the Guidelines, there
was also wisdom in the other sentencing factors-sometimes conflicting wisdom-and
the wisdom in all factors must be considered. 393 Booker is "an invitation, not to
unmoored decision making, but to the type of careful analysis of the evidence that should
be considered when depriving a person of his or her liberty." 394 Therefore, the court
would assess, "as mandatory considerations," 39 5 the factors included in title 18,
397
396
In United States v. Wanning,
section 3553(a)(1), (3), (4)-(7) of the U.S. Code.

Judge Richard Kopf aligned himself with Judge Cassell and explained why he did not
agree with Judge Pratt. 398 He found no conflict between statutory sentencing goals and
the Guidelines: "Where is the conflict? The Guidelines tell a judge how to 'consider'
age, health, and a myriad other statutorily relevant factors." 399 Judge Kopf asserted that
Judge Pratt's real concern was "that nothing much has changed [and that] the 'remedial'
opinion in Booker has rendered meaningless the 'merits' opinion. ''4° ° He first explained
that if result of Booker was little change, that was what the Supreme Court had
chosen. 4 0 1 He went on to explain that if the Guidelines were not given great deference,
the result would be "to return federal sentencing practices to the period before the
Guidelines when old white men like me could and did sentence anywhere they wanted so
long as they uttered some legal mumbo jumbo. ' '4 ° 2 Judge Pratt, however, 40
observed
that
3
if the Guidelines were presumptive, they would still be mandatory in effect.
In Oklahoma, Judge Sven Holmes found that "law, policy, and common sense
dictate that this Court should exercise its discretion by strictly applying in all cases the
Guidelines, modified to satisfy Blakely. '4 04 Rather than follow in Judge Cassell's
footsteps, applying the Guidelines "[i]n all but the most unusual cases,' '40 5 Judge
Holmes would follow them in all cases. However, he apparently disagreed with the
Supreme Court's analysis in Booker that Congress would have preferred an advisory
system to a modified mandatory one.4 06 Accordingly, he determined that, in his court, a
guilty plea would be accepted only if "accompanied by a Sixth Amendment waiver of
jury that expressly applies to both guilt or innocence and to sentencing. ', 40 7 Otherwise,

392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.

U.S. v. Myers, 353 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1027-28 (S.D. Iowa 2005).
Id. at 1028-29.
Id. at 1029 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 1029.
Id.; see supra n. 350 and accompanying text.
354 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (D. Neb. 2005).
Id. at 1058-62.
Id. at 1060-61 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 1061.
Id.
Wanning, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 1062.
Myers, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 1028.
U.S. v. Barkley, 369 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1311 (N.D. Okla. 2005).
Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 914.
See Barkley, 369 F. Supp. 2d at 1315.
Id. at 1318.
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cases would proceed to trial, where "all relevant issues will ensue in accordance with the
Sixth Amendment. ''408 In special cases, the trial would be bifurcated, with guilt or
innocence determined at the first trial and sentencing evidence presented at the second
one. 40 9 In all cases, whether sentencing is based on judicial fact-finding or on the
findings of a jury, contested facts must be "established beyond a reasonable doubt in
accordance with the federal rules of evidence." 4 10 In this way, Judge Holmes will
exercise the discretion allowed under Booker, "accommodate the Sixth Amendment
rights articulated in Blakely," and maintain "the integrity of the federal sentencing
system." 4 11 In the case before him, he noted,
[A] sentence of life imprisonment would be the best, and most accurate, reflection of this
jurist's own personal view of the appropriate sentence. The most reasonable sentence,
however, would be a sentence under the Guidelines, which represents my personal views
tempered by considerations of propriety and fairness across the system nationwide. Put
simply, I reject the notion that my personal views of justice in an isolated 4case
are
12
preferable to the twenty years of collective wisdom represented by the Guidelines.

There is not yet any clear consensus as to how the courts will or should balance the
Guidelines with the other sentencing factors. Some district courts have followed Judge
Cassell's lead and have indicated their intention to accord the Guidelines substantial
weight. 4 13 Others are inclined to balance the Guidelines with the other sentencing
factors. 4 14 While some judges are exercising their restored discretion in sentencing, not
all of that discretion is being used to impose sentences lower than those of the
4 15
Guidelines.
VIII. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's action, making the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory
rather than mandatory, may have one of two different results. Either there will be a
return to indeterminate sentencing, wherein each judge exercises personal discretion over
what sentence will be imposed within a statutory range of minimum and maximum, thus

408. Id.
409. Id. at 1319.
410. Id. at 1318-19.
411. Barkley, 369 F. Supp. 2d at 1318.
412. Id. at 1317 (footnote omitted).
413. See e.g. U.S. v. Peach, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (D.N.D. 2005).
414. See e.g. Simon v. U.S., 361 F. Supp. 2d 35 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). Other examples include: John Whitrock,
who was sentenced to fifteen years in federal prison for bank robbery, even though the recommended sentence
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines was only seven to nine years, Paul Gustafson, Fishing Hat Bandit
Draws 15 Years, Star Tribune (Minneapolis, Minn.) 1B (Sept. 14, 2005), and Rosalyn McKinney, accused of
being part of a conspiracy to distribute illegal drugs, who was "sentenced to 100 hours of community service
and four years on probation, with the first six months of it to be spent in a federal halfway house," Maureen
Hayden, Woman Given Second Chance, Evansville Courier & Press (Evansville, Ind.) AI (Sept. 14, 2005). In
McKinney's case, the Guidelines sentencing range was 41-51 months. Id
415. An April 2005 memorandum from the Office of Policy Analysis revealed that 61.4% of sentences were
within the Guidelines range, compared to 65% in fiscal year 2002. Memo. from Linda Drazga Maxfield, Off.
Policy Analysis, to J. Hinojosa, Chair, U.S. Senten. Commn., Numbers on Post-Booker Sentencings: Data
Extract on April 5, 2003 (Apr. 13, 2005) (available at http://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/booker 041305.pdf). The
percentage of sentences above the Guidelines range had more than doubled over 2002. Id. Of the total below
range sentences, most had been sponsored by the government. Id.
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risking a return to widely disparate sentencing, or the Guidelines will be presumptively
followed, rendering the Court's remedy mere lip service paid to the Sixth Amendment
concerns of Blakely and Booker. If the latter, the remedial opinion will have provided no
real solution to the problem. If the former, the Court's remedy will have made good the
dissent's dire prediction in Blakely.416 Whenever the issue of unconstitutionality arises,
the preferred position is to save the basic entity by severing the offensive parts. 4 17 The
entire statute must fall only if removal of the offending portion would so thwart
Congress's intent that it is apparent that the measure would not have been enacted in its
modified version.
In enacting the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which established the U.S.
Sentencing Commission and empowered it with promulgating sentencing guidelines,
Congress sought to put an end to disparity in sentencing. 4 18 Before the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines took effect, judges could impose sentences with no explanation of
their reasoning or the facts used to determine the sentence. Under the mandatory Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, the reasons for any departures from the presumptive sentence had
to be explicitly stated by the judge and were subject to appellate review. In enacting the
"Feeney Amendment," Congress reiterated its commitment to constraining rather than
4 19
expanding judicial discretion.
If Booker had applied Blakely to doom the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
completely, the probable result would be a return to indeterminate sentencing, which
would have expanded judicial discretion. However, under the Booker Court's remedial
opinion, a return to indeterminate sentencing may very well be the result. Since
Congress wanted to constrain rather than expand judicial discretion, it seems unlikely
that it would have failed to pass the Sentencing Reform Act simply because judges'
discretion might be constrained somewhat further than anticipated. The Booker Court's
remedial majority seems to have missed the point of both Blakely and sentencing
reform-it expands judicial discretion rather than restricting it. A better remedy would
have been to have retained the mandatory nature of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
but to have modified them in a way that would avoid violating the Sixth Amendment420
retaining determinate sentencing in a way that respects the Sixth Amendment.
If, instead of removing the requirement that judges follow the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, the Court had severed the provision that requires judges, based on their own
fact-finding, to enhance sentences beyond the presumptive Guidelines range, the basic
structure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines would remain. The result would further
constrain judicial discretion. This is more harmonious with the intent of the Sentencing
Reform Act and with Blakely. Critics argued that this method of severing the
unconstitutional portions of the Guidelines would result in shorter sentences, which they

416. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. 2543 (O'Connor dissent) ("The effect of today's decision will be greater judicial
discretion and less uniformity in sentencing.").
417.
418.
419.
420.

Regan, 468 U.S. at 652.
U.S. Senten. Commn., supra n. 134, at iv, 79.
Bibas, supra n. 245.
Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2540 (majority opinion).
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maintained thwarts congressional intent.42 1 While shorter sentences might result from
this method, it is not mandatory that they do.
This remedy would not eliminate enhancements for real conduct, but would require
that the facts of that conduct be found by a jury or admitted by the defendant. Judicial
discretion would not be expanded and the Sixth Amendment would have been respected
rather than circumvented. This seems much more in keeping with both the intent of
Congress in enacting the Sentencing Reform Act and the opinions of the Court in Blakely
and in the Booker merits opinion. Although many have rejected the concept as too
expensive or too cumbersome, 422 greater use of juries would allow the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines to be mandatory and yet to be used to increase sentences in
particularly egregious cases without violating the Sixth Amendment. Juries could be
used in two different ways-"pre-verdict" and "post-verdict."
The normal trial jury would be the pre-verdict jury. It would have the
responsibility of finding all facts presented to it by the prosecution and rendering a
verdict on all of them. This would include a verdict regarding guilt, but would go
beyond that to determine whether certain aggravating factors were present. If the factors
were present, the judge could then use those findings of facts to impose a sentence in
excess of the presumptive sentence. Before Booker, this was being done in many federal
courtrooms. Prosecutors were "Blakely-izing" indictments to include all facts that
should be considered for sentencing.
The post-verdict jury would be used only when there were facts that could not be
included in the indictment and trial without prejudicing the defendant's case. Examples
include cases in which a defense relies on the defendant's not being involved in the
crime. It is difficult to argue, "I wasn't there, but if I was, I didn't use a gun," or "That
isn't my cocaine, and if it is, it's all powder, no crack. '' 4 23 In these cases, when the jury
delivers a guilty verdict, there would be an additional hearing to determine those facts
the prosecution or judge wants to use to enhance the defendant's sentence. Either the
original jury or a newly-empanelled one could be the post-verdict jury, which would then
determine whether or not the aggravating factors were present. In this way, sentencing
could continue to "tie real punishment to real conduct, ' ' 4 24 but maintain the defendant's
rights under the Sixth Amendment by having all the facts used to increase his sentence
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
There might be increased costs for additional fact-finding, whether by the
pre-verdict or post-verdict jury. Additional time would be involved in hearing the
evidence and in deliberations. Cost considerations would be part of decisions made to
seek enhancements, but prosecutors consider the cost of litigation whenever they are
considering whether to go to trial or reach a plea agreement. This would be no different.
Prosecutors would determine whether it was cost-efficient to seek an enhanced sentence.
Sentencing juries are routinely used in death penalty cases since Ring; prosecutors would
make the same sort of decision in seeking enhancements that they now make in seeking

421.
422.
423.
424.

Seee.g. Einstman, 325 F. Supp. 2d 373.
Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2556 (Breyer dissent).
ld.at 2556-57.
Id.at 2557.
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the death penalty. Occasions for these decisions may be fewer than most might think.
In 2004, less than 5% of all federal sentencing was the result of a trial.4 25 In the same
period, less than 1% of federal sentences imposed were in excess of the presumptive
Guidelines sentence. 426 It is likely that there would be somewhat fewer if prosecutors
faced increased costs and a higher burden of proof.
Punishment for real conduct is something that Justice Breyer has maintained is an
essential part of the Congress's goal for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines-so essential
that in his view, Congress would have preferred that the Guidelines be only advisory
rather than to have modified judges' ability to punish real conduct. "Real conduct" is a
euphemism for uncharged conduct that is not subject to the usual requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Even the evidentiary standards are lowered for real
conduct. 42742Hearsay is allowed.428 And defendants are deprived of liberty as a result of
"facts" found only by a preponderance of the evidence and without complying with the
429
Federal Rules of Evidence. Loss of liberty is something that cannot be corrected.
Federal sentencing based on real conduct should be curtailed by enacting legislation
similar to the "real facts doctrine" in the state of Washington.4 30 Judge Cassell cited a
study in which it was found that most people's ideas of appropriate sentencing ranges for
particular crimes were very close to the ranges provided in the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines for those crimes. 43 1 However, the sentences presented as examples were not
sentences enhanced for real conduct. 43 2 It is questionable whether people would find
such enhanced sentences palatable if they were aware of their duration and of the manner
in which they were reached. Does it not seem fundamentally wrong that, in the United
States, where the Constitution guarantees the right to both a trial by jury and due process,
people lose years of their lives due to presumptions of real conduct?
It is still too early to tell how much sentencing disparity will result from the
remedy in Booker. Even if no great disparity results, legislation to limit that discretion
should be in order. The current statutory sentencing ranges have been broad to allow the
Sentencing Guidelines room in which to be implemented. With judges' discretion now
limited only by these broad ranges, there is far too much room for widely disparate
sentencing for the same crimes. In the past, with indeterminate sentencing, the parole
system acted as a means through which an overly long sentence could be modified. That
is no longer the case. Accordingly, statutory sentences should be narrowed and refined,
making them more closely tailored to specifically limited crimes. This would limit
judicial discretion and would require prosecutors to charge a defendant with the actual
crime for which he is ultimately being punished. This is not a matter of not being tough

425. U.S. Senten. Commn., Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics tbl. 11 (2004) (available at
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2004/SBTOC04.htm).

426. Id. at tbl. 32, tbl. 45.
427. Reitz, supra n. 163, at 548.

428. Id. at 549.
429. Jeffrey Cole, My Afternoon with Alex: An Interview with Judge Kozinski, 30 Litig. 6, 19

(Summer 2004).
430. See supra pt. Ill(A)(3).
431. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2dat917.

432. Id.
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on crime, but rather being tough on the justice system to assure that it is accurately
charging defendants and is diligent in providing evidence that will withstand the higher
burden of proof generally required for criminal charges.
Reading the merits opinion in Booker and the majority opinion in Blakely it seems
clear that the Court has expressed a firm commitment to a defendant's right to have a
jury decide all facts used to deprive him of liberty. While the way to protect that right
will have some costs, the Court and the country should see such costs as a "modest
43 3
inconvenience."
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